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Abstract 
Labor market regulation can have harmful unintended consequences. In many markets, especially for public 
sector workers, pay is regulated to be the same for individuals across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. 
We would predict that this will mean labor supply problems and potential falls in the quality of service 
provision in areas with stronger labor markets. In this paper we exploit panel data from the population of 
English acute hospitals where pay for medical staff is almost flat across the country. We predict that areas with 
higher outside wages should suffer from problems of recruiting, retaining and motivating high quality workers 
and this should harm hospital performance. We construct hospital-level panel data on both quality - as measured 
by death rates (within hospital deaths within thirty days of emergency admission for acute myocardial 
infarction, AMI) - and productivity. We present evidence that stronger local labor markets significantly worsen 
hospital outcomes in terms of quality and productivity. A 10% increase in the outside wage is associated with a 
4% to 8% increase in AMI death rates. We find that an important part of this effect operates through hospitals in 
high outside wage areas having to rely more on temporary “agency staff” as they are unable to increase 
(regulated) wages in order to attract permanent employees. By contrast, we find no systematic role for an effect 
of outside wages of performance when we run placebo experiments in 42 other service sectors (including 
nursing homes) where pay is unregulated. 
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Economists have long warned of the unintended consequences of labor market 
regulation (e.g. Botero et al, 2004). Many rules rationalized by equity considerations 
can be harmful both to those that they are meant to help and to consumers. There are 
many studies of labor quantity restrictions (e.g. hiring and firing costs) and labor price 
floors (e.g. minimum wages). One common but under-studied form of regulation is 
centralized wage setting, where pay is mandated to be almost flat over a large 
geographical area which includes very heterogeneous local labor markets. In the US 
the pay of postal workers, Federal government employees and some unionized 
employees are set in this way and this extends to physicians, nurses, high school 
teachers, etc. in many other countries.  
 
We would expect such regulations for nominal wage equality to have unintended 
effects on both labor supply and the quality of service provision in areas with strong 
local labor markets.  When the outside wage is high the regulated wage acts as a pay 
ceiling and we would expect this to cause difficulties in recruitment and retention. 
Over and above the effects of reduced labor supply of permanent workers, large pay 
gaps may lead to lower motivation and/or lower quality workers, which in turn should 
lead to a lower quality of service provision.  The main contribution of this paper is to 
confirm this simple economic intuition and to show that centralized pay regulation has 
exactly this negative impact on consumers in a very stark setting. Our design uses the 
centralized pay setting of over a quarter of a million nurses in the UK National Health 
Service (NHS).  Nurses account for over half of the clinical staff in hospitals and their 
number and quality have been argued to be key inputs into the production of patient 
care, for example motivating California to mandate nurse to patient ratios in all 
Californian hospitals from January 2004. We find evidence that the regulation of 
nurses’ pay leads to higher fatality rates after admissions for heart attacks and lower 
productivity in areas with strong labor markets.  
 
In general, testing the impact of wages on organizational performance is challenging, 
because in a competitive market wages are equalized for workers of the same skill. 
Where pay is set by regulation, however, there is a wedge between wages inside and 
outside the regulated sector, which in principle allows the econometrician to identify 
the impact of fluctuation in external labor markets on firm outcomes.  
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One advantage of our setting is that there is a very rigid national pay setting structure 
for medical staff and well-measured outcomes of hospital quality.  Pay for nurses and 
physicians in NHS hospitals, which provide almost all hospital care in the UK, is set 
by a central review body that sets pay scales in which there is limited regional 
variation.  The variation that exists does not fully reflect the wages differentials in the 
external labor markets in which the staff are employed.  Regional pay differences are 
considerable in the UK (e.g. Bulman, 2002). For example, female white-collar wages 
in North East England are about 60% lower than in Inner London and these persist 
after controlling for human capital characteristics and other factors1.  We would 
therefore expect to see differences between inside and outside wages reflected in 
staffing difficulties that manifest themselves in the lower performance of hospitals 
operating in high outside wage labor markets2. 
 
A second advantage of our design is that patient selection (the concern that observed 
hospital death rates may partially reflect unobserved patient attributes) is less likely to 
affect our study than if we used US data. The institutional setting is one where there is 
almost no choice of hospitals by patients and minimal incentives for hospitals to select 
patients.  Medical care is free at the point of use in the UK.  In the period we study 
neither patients nor their family physicians chose hospitals for the emergency 
treatment of heart attacks: even for non-emergency care patients had little say over 
where they went for treatment.  Hospitals also had, in contrast to US hospitals, little 
incentive to select low risk and low cost patients.  UK hospitals were not required to 
publish outcome data (for example their mortality rates) and nor were the costs of an 
individual patient easily identified as full public insurance meant hospital financial 
systems were not designed to record costs at the patient level.  Nevertheless, we 
carefully assess the evidence for possible selectivity biases through the use of hospital 
fixed effects, co-morbidity measures and analysis of business cycle influences.  
 
The data we use is from a panel of all acute hospitals in England. To measure 
performance we examine one measure of hospital quality - the death rate within thirty 
                                                 
1 As in the United States (e.g. Borjas, 2002) the cross sectional dispersion of UK public sector pay is 
much lower than in the private sector (e.g. Disney and Gosling, 1998). 
2 There is other evidence that falling UK public sector wages relative to the private sector have led to a 
decline in the quality of the public sector workforce (Nickell and Quintini, 2002). 
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days of emergency admission for acute myocardial infarction (AMI)3 – and one of 
productivity (total output per clinical worker).  We find evidence that the impact of 
pay regulation is to generate lower hospital quality and productivity in the areas where 
labor markets are strong, as measured by higher wages in the outside labor market 
relative to the wage inside the hospital.  This effect is not simply due to fewer staff as 
the effect of outside wages is present even after controlling for standard labor inputs. 
Nor is the effect the result of general UK labor market conditions. We run many 
placebo experiments demonstrating that this “outside wage” effect on performance 
does not occur in similar sectors that are not subject to centralized pay setting (for 
example, nursing homes for senior citizens).  We also show that hospitals in high 
outside wage areas have to rely disproportionately on temporary agency staff and this 
intensive use of agency staff is associated with worse health outcomes. Finally, 
consistent with basic production theory we find that hospitals with a richer mix of 
skills (e.g. more physicians and more nurses) also have better hospital outcomes. 
 
Our paper is connected to several other literatures in addition to that on the economic 
impact of pay regulation. First, as mentioned, labor economists have long been 
interested in the impact of labor market changes on firm performance. Theories of 
“efficiency wages”, for example, suggest that improvements in the labor market 
outside the firm’s boundaries could lead to decreased productivity within a firm 
because there may be more shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), a loss of high 
quality workers (Weiss, 1980) or perceptions of inequity (e.g. Akerlof, 1982; Mas, 
2006).  It is difficult to test these ideas in an unregulated labor market. Where pay is 
set by regulation, however, there is a wedge between inside and outside wages that 
enables identification of the impact of external labor markets on firm outcomes. So 
we can effectively use regulation to generate exogenous variation in factor prices4.  
                                                 
3  Examples of the use of AMI death rates to proxy hospital quality include Kessler and McClellan 
(2002), Gaynor (2004) and, for the UK, Propper et al (2004 and forthcoming). The advantages of this 
measure are discussed below.  
4 Cawley et al (2006) find that higher outside wages are associated with worse health outcomes in US 
nursing homes. In their paper, the mechanism is that stronger external labor markets lead to higher 
inside wages and therefore a substitution away from nursing care towards labor saving medical 
interventions. In our paper, by contrast, we hold inside wages fixed and still identify a negative effect of 
outside wages. In the US where wages are not regulated, increasing factor prices move hospitals up the 
labor demand curve rather than the labor supply curve. The positive marginal effects of inside wages 
we find here are consistent with our interpretation that NHS wages are generally set on the labor supply 
curve. 
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Second, our findings on the use of temporary agency staff relates to an emerging line 
of literature on the causes and consequences of the use of temporary workers5. Third, 
we connect to a large literature in industrial organization on productivity dispersion. 
We document large differences in performance across hospitals, just as has been 
observed for firms in other sectors (e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2005). We 
argue that one reason for this heterogeneity in the English context is the effect of 
regulated wages on outcomes. Fourth, our study relates to the literature on the impact 
of local economic conditions on health. Such studies focus on how economic 
conditions affect the demand for health by changing people’s wealth or stress levels. 
For example, in recent work, Ruhm (2006) argues that there are a greater number of 
heart attacks during upturns in the business cycle6.  Our paper suggests an alternative 
mechanism that operates through the supply side.  In our model labor market 
conditions, combined with rigid national pay setting, affect the supply of a key 
clinical input that, in turn, affects health. Finally, our study relates to the literature that 
examines the relationship between skills and productivity in the context of hospital 
production (discussed in Appendix A).   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section I we discuss the institutional 
background and the nature of the research design. In Section II we sketch the 
econometric model that we are estimating and issues surrounding the approach. In 
Section III we discuss the data and in Section IV offer a preliminary data description. 
Section V presents the main econometric results and some robustness tests are 
discussed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII offers concluding comments. 
I. Institutional background and the research design 
 
In the UK health care is free at the point of use and is provided through the NHS, a 
state monopoly provider7. Just over 1.2 million workers are employed in the NHS and 
the wages and conditions of clinical staff are strictly regulated. Since our study 
examines clinical care in acute hospitals we focus on three main occupational groups: 
physicians, qualified nurses and health care assistants (essentially unqualified clinical 
                                                 
5 For example see Autor and Houseman (2005) or Houseman et al (2003). 
6 We explore the implications of any association between cyclical upturns and community health 
below. 
7 There is a small privately funded sector, which specializes in the provision of elective services for 
which there are long NHS waiting lists.  
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staff). Exact definitions are given in the data section, but broadly clinical staff account 
for three-quarters of all hospital employees. In our sample 15% of clinical staff are 
physicians, 60% are nurses and 25% are health care assistants (see Table 1). 
 
Physicians and nurses’ pay is regulated to a precise national scale that has little 
differentiation over the country, despite a wide variation in regional labor markets. 
Since 1984 these pay scales have been set by two “National Pay Review Bodies” 
(NPRBs) known as the Review Body for Nursing Staff, Midwives and Professions 
Allied to Medicine, and the Review Body for Doctors and Dentists. Each year, the 
Review Bodies take evidence from the Department of Health, the main labor unions 
and other interested parties before making a recommendation on changes to the level 
and structure of pay. The government makes the final decision about whether or not to 
implement their recommendations (it generally implements them in full).  For the 
health care assistants group there is no Pay Review Body and employers have more 
discretion over setting pay in response to local conditions.  
 
Under these national scales the same terms and conditions apply across the UK and 
they allow only minor differences in pay between different areas. Additional 
allowances are paid to those who work in London and contiguous areas, but these are 
small relative to the differences in the external labor market. These allowances are up 
to 11% higher in the highest cost area of Inner London compared to the low cost 
areas. The outside wage differential is closer to 60% (see Appendix B). Beyond these 
regional allowances hospitals have little scope for aligning the pay of qualified staff to 
conditions in local labor market conditions. Pay scales are short and offer very little 
scope for either appointing new hires at different points on the scale, or accelerating 
workers up to higher grades. The centralized pay setting arrangements do not allow 
pay to be easily adjusted to address staff shortages in local markets.  
 
From an econometric perspective, this institutional setting is attractive because it 
enables an examination of the impact of different local wages on hospital outcomes. 
In most labor markets, changes in equilibrium wages will be the outcome of demand 
and supply shocks, so identifying their impact on hospital outcomes is difficult as the 
labor price is endogenous to the unobserved shocks. In the UK case the wage inside 
the hospital (which we will call the “inside wage”) is held broadly fixed as outside 
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shocks change skill prices (which we will call the “outside wage”) in the local labor 
market. There is therefore a wedge between the worker’s inside wage and the outside 
wage. Consequently, variation in the outside wage can be used to analyze the effects 
of labor markets on performance. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the case for two local labor markets, “North” and “South” where 
outside wages are much higher in the South than in the North (generating a shift to the 
left in the labor supply curve).  Given an equal pay rate across geographic areas this 
will mean a lower level of employment in the South compared to the North.  
 
In principle, the regulated wage could be set above the competitive wage so it acts as 
a minimum wage and thus employers shed staff. However, in the period studied here 
there were chronic shortages of nurses and clinical unemployment has been close to 
zero (e.g. Finlayson et al, 2002). Therefore, it is more likely that the wage is being set 
below the competitive wage generating excess demand8. It is possible, however, that 
wages are set above the competitive wage in some low outside wage areas in the 
North and workers in these areas are earning rents (we look at this issue in Section 
VI). 
 
 
We consider the consequences of regulating wages for health workers in this way, 
first analyzing employer responses then worker responses.  Turning first to the firm 
side, employers will try to overcome the regulatory constraint in several ways. First, 
they could over-promote identical workers to higher grades even if they do not have 
the requisite skills (so-called “grade drift”). This will help them achieve the desired 
labor quantity, but at the cost of the lower quality of the over-promoted staff. 
Empirically, after controlling for grading structure we would still expect to see worse 
quality in the high outside wage areas. Second, employers could offer various non-
pecuniary benefits such as better working conditions in the high wage areas. These 
                                                  
8 In the absence of pay regulation, large local hospitals may have monopsony power so the equilibrium 
wage will not be at the intersection of the labor demand and supply curve. But so long as the regulated 
wage lies below the monopsony wage, the constraint will still be binding on some employers and the 
mechanism we identify will operate. 
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strategies are limited by clinical unions’ power in pushing for homogeneous national 
conditions and governments have been reluctant to challenge this9.  
 
Third, assuming the regulated wage is binding, cost-minimizing employers will try to 
adjust by substituting towards other factors of production. Consequently, other types 
of staff whose pay is less constrained by regulated pay will increase and non-labor 
factors will be in higher demand. Because of the specific skills required for different 
medical interventions, however, substitution to much less skilled workers (health care 
assistants and non-clinical NHS staff) will be limited. One key group of workers 
where substitution is easier is temporary “agency” staff. There are a large number of 
nurses (and other staff) employed in hospitals on temporary contracts. Private sector 
firms supply temporary agency nurses to the NHS and these workers do not have their 
pay regulated by the state. Consequently, the availability of agency staff will enable 
NHS employers to bring their employment closer to their desired levels. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 where we consider a high outside wage labor market 
(“South”). The regulated wage determines the number of “permanent” staff that the 
hospital can employ. If the supply of agency nurses is competitive then the wage paid 
to agency nurses will be bid up to the point that labor demand intersects with labor 
supply at the competitive wage10.   
 
Turning to the employee side, in local areas where outside opportunities are better 
nurses will supply less labor as shown in Figure 1. In a static sense, this may lead to 
lower participation rates, as fewer qualified staff will offer themselves for work. In a 
dynamic search setting this will lead to higher rates of vacancies and turnover in the 
high outside wage areas.  
                                                 
9 The desire for nominal wage equality across workers in different geographical areas has long been a 
mainstay of union activity. It is not obvious why this should be the case, as real wages within the NHS 
are made more unequal since the cost of living varies by area. However, if unions represent the view of 
the median worker, as in the model of Grossman (1983), this worker may be better off with a more 
compressed wage policy.  
10 This raises the question of why nurses want to work in the public sector instead of simply becoming 
agency nurses and earning more. Permanent employees have other non-pecuniary benefits such as 
greater job security, better promotion prospects and enhanced pensions and heterogeneous preferences 
over these elements of the job package. Furthermore, there may be stigma attached to being an agency 
nurse rather than a full-time employee as many nurses are “motivated agents” in the sense of Besley 
and Ghatak (2005). Nurses could also work in the private sector. However, the demand for nurses in 
the private sector is limited by the small size of this sector in England and nurses in this sector have 
less opportunity for promotion and training. 
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Our focus in this paper is whether there are effects of wage regulation on hospital 
outcomes over and above the pure effects of reduced labor supply of permanent 
workers.  We focus on nurses as the labor market for physicians is basically a national 
one, as the NHS operates a career track for physicians that ends with a lifetime 
appointment to a single NHS hospital, but is preceded by movement between 
hospitals and regions in a national context, which reflects the national provision of 
training facilities for physicians.   
 
From the framework above, a stronger local labor market generates substitution 
towards temporary agency nurses. The reliance on temporary agency workers in the 
high outside wage areas may reduce hospital performance for several reasons. First, 
agency nurses may have lower human capital than permanent nurses. Some studies 
show that they tend to be younger, less experienced and have less training (e.g. Audit 
Commission, 2001). Second, even for ex ante identical nurses, being a temporary 
worker may lead to lower productivity in hospitals because of lower job specific 
human capital11. Thirdly, they may also be less committed to the public service 
“mission” of the NHS (e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2005).  On top of the use of agency 
staff, there may also be effects of the outside wage on the effort of workers through 
various efficiency wage channels such as lower motivation and greater shirking.  
 
If mobility were costless and there existed a single national labor market then using 
local outside wages as a signal of labor market pressure makes little sense. However, 
mobility in Britain is far less than in the US (for example, less than 1% of adults move 
between the UK regions in a given year, compared to 7% across the much larger US 
states).  Nurses are predominantly female, often with childcare responsibilities and 
need to be geographically close to hospitals, as they are required to work shifts 
(Shields, 2004).  It is likely, therefore, that mobility is not perfectly responsive to 
wage differentials. We show some evidence for this below - if mobility was costless it 
                                                 
11 The Audit Commission (2001) finds that agency nurses have little notice before working their shifts 
and that they are often employed to provide cover at weekends and at night when direct supervision is 
less likely to be available. As a result, induction and handover may be inadequate, agency nurses may 
have little time to get accustomed to the workings of the hospital, may be unfamiliar with the patients 
under their care or with local procedures, practices and equipment, with their surroundings and their 
colleagues. The Commission argues all these factors increase the chances of poorer quality care. 
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is unlikely that geographic differentials of the magnitude we observe could be 
sustained. 
II. Empirical strategy 
 
A. Modeling Approach 
To motivate our empirical work, assume that we can characterize the output of a 
representative hospital by a Cobb–Douglas production function12  
βα KALY =                                                                   (1) 
where Y is quality constant output, L is effective labor input allowing for quality and 
quantity dimensions, K is a vector of non-labor inputs (which for expositional 
simplicity we will treat as scalar) and A is a Hicks neutral efficiency parameter. We 
denote L as the product of “effort” (E) and labor quantity (
~
L ), so ELL
~
= . Effort is a 
catch all term for the other factors that transforms labor into efficiency units. 
 
We consider disaggregating the labor quantity into different types of heterogeneous 
workers so that the labor quantity index can be written as: 
kk
k
NL γ∑=
~
                                                       (2) 
where Nk is labor of skill type k with relative marginal productivity γ k  ( > 1) and we 
normalize γ  = 1 for k = 0, the lowest skill type13. Taking logs of equation (1) and 
substituting in equation (2) and the definition of L, we obtain: 
 
})1(1ln{lnlnlnlnln
0,
∑
≠
−+++++=
kk
kk SKNAEY γαβα          (3) 
 
where N is the sum of employees and the share of workers of skill class k is 
N
NS kk = . 
We model the effort function as14: 
 
                                                 
12 This should be viewed as a first-order approximation to a more flexible functional form. It is 
straightforward to generalize this to more complex functional forms such as translog and we discuss 
some experiments in the results section.  
13 See inter alia  Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999). 
14 See Machin and Manning (1992) for an example of this approach in the efficiency wage literature. 
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E = e(W,WO,Z)                                                (4) 
 
Where W is the “inside” wage (i.e. the wage paid inside the hospital), WO is the 
“outside” wage and Z are other factors affecting effort/quality of workers. We expect 
effort to be rising in the inside wage and falling in the outside wage other things 
equal. Using a first order log linear approximation for the effort function, e(.) in 
equation (4) and substituting this into equation (3) gives: 
 
θϕδγαβα 'lnlnln})1(1ln{lnlnlnln
0,
ZWWSKNAY O
kk
kk +++−++++= ∑
≠
       
(5) 
An alternative to estimating (5) directly by nonlinear least squares is by using the 
approximation ln(1+x) ≈  x which gives us:      
 
θϕδγαβα 'lnlnln)1(lnlnlnln
0,
ZWWSKNAY O
kk
kk +++−+++= ∑
≠
   (6) 
Theoretically, the object of the left hand side of equation (6), Y, is quality-adjusted 
output. However, we do not observe this directly. Instead, use two proxies, one of 
quality and one of total output, as measures of performance. The precise data 
definitions are discussed below. 
 
B. Interpreting the wage effects  
The wage effects in equation (6) reflect any impact wages may have on (average) 
worker effort or worker quality. We expect ϕ  < 0 because conditional on a given 
inside wage (W) an increase in the outside wage ( OW ) should reduce effort, E. 
Similarly, holding labor inputs fixed, an increase in the inside wage should increase 
output (δ  > 0). The various mechanisms have been extensively discussed in the 
efficiency wage literature discussed in the introduction such as shirking, turnover, 
worker quality and fairness. In the context of the publicly run NHS this may be 
reflected in a greater reliance on agency nurses, who are contracted on a temporary 
basis to NHS hospitals. We explicitly examine this and other mechanisms in the 
results section.  
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As discussed above, wages can also have an effect on hospital performance through 
the quantity of employees of different skill types. Conditioning the production 
function on labor inputs in equation (6) abstracts away from these effects so we can 
focus on whether there is an impact of the labor markets through the E(.) function15. 
We will therefore be underestimating the importance of wages on hospital production 
and show specifications where we relax this.  
 
C. Econometric models 
We estimate the “production function” for hospital i at time t as: 
 
θϕδββµ '21 lnlnlnlnln)/ln( itOititNURSESitPHYSitititit ZWWSSNANY ++++++=     (7) 
 
Y is total output (essentially admissions), PHYSitS  is the share of physicians in total 
clinical staff and NURSESitS  is the share of qualified nurses (precise definition of all the 
variables are in Section IV below.)  Compared to equation (6) we have used three 
main skill groups, physicians, qualified nurses and the base category of health care 
assistants which includes the unqualified nursing staff. Physicians receive the largest 
amount of training16, nurses the second highest amount and health care assistants the 
least. So in terms of the model we expect 021 >> ββ . Note that we have transformed 
the dependent variable from output into “productivity” so 1−= αµ  is a scale 
parameter that will be equal to zero under constant returns. Our baseline regressions 
include employment as a control for hospital size, but we also show the robustness to 
imposing constant returns to avoid an obvious division bias (employment being on the 
left hand side and right hand side of the regression). We have absorbed the non-labor 
inputs into the Z-vector. Another important set of controls in Z are casemix terms to 
allow for patients of different severity of illness.  
                                                 
15 Because we observe a discrete number of skill groups one concern is that we are grouping over 
heterogeneous skill groups within these categories. The interpretation of the inside wage becomes 
ambiguous because it may simply reflect unobserved labor quality. The coefficient on the outside 
wage, however, should be robust to this problem of interpretation as the theory implies that it should 
take a negative value. If outside wages simply proxied for the measurement error in human capital 
inside the hospital we would expect the coefficient on outside wages to be positive. 
16 Physicians in the UK follow a five year undergraduate Batchelor’s program and then spend a further 
four to eleven years in training, depending on their specialty. Nurses follow a three year undergraduate 
Batchelor’s program to become a registered nurse. Specialist nurses then train for a further year (or 
more).   
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Since we have panel data we decompose the unobserved total factor productivity term 
into its variance components: ittiitA ντη ++=ln  where iη  is a hospital effect, tτ  are 
a set of time dummies and itν  is a stochastic error term whose properties we discuss 
below.  
 
ittiit
O
itit
NURSES
it
PHYS
itititit ZWWSSNANY ντηθϕδββµ +++++++++= '21 lnlnlnlnln)/ln(
 
       (8) 
We present results treating iη  as a fixed effect (e.g. long-differenced results or 
Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM method described below) and also results 
treating iη  as uncorrelated with the right hand side variables (i.e. standard OLS).  We 
use various proxies for the outside wage ( OitWln ) based on average wages in the local 
labor market around the hospital. We primarily use measures at a disaggregated level 
(we have seventy-eight distinct “travel to work” areas in our data), but experiment 
with a relatively aggregate level (the ten regions of England). We focus on female 
non-manual wages as this is the most likely comparator group for nurses but we also 
consider other comparison groups for the outside wage (e.g. male wages). The nature 
of the NHS means physicians essentially operate in a national labor market: the time 
dummies will capture their outside wages.  Since hospitals are a small part of the local 
labor market we treat the outside wage as exogenous, although we lag the variable by 
a year to avoid any immediate feedback effects from transient area level shocks 
(permanent shocks are picked up by hospital fixed effects). 
 
Identification of the coefficient on the inside wage,δ , is more challenging. We 
observe the hospital inside wage, but higher wages may reflect a better skill mix such 
as a superior grading structure, which we do not perfectly observe. Thus, finding a 
positive coefficient on the average inside wage could simply reflect the better 
performance of hospitals with higher average human capital. Note, however, that if 
the outside wage partly reflects higher wages/skills inside the hospital, this will bias 
the coefficient on the outside wage towards zero, making it harder to reject the null 
hypothesis. Consequently, we present a first set of results that do not condition on 
inside wage information under the assumption that the inside wage is truly national. 
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We then consider alternative methods of including the inside wage. Our main method 
is to include the inside wage and use the system GMM approach discussed below to 
allow for endogeneity.  
 
Identifying the coefficients on the factor inputs in production functions is an old 
problem in econometrics (see Ackerberg et al, 2007, for a recent survey). In equation 
(8) the endogenous factor inputs are the numbers of employees of different skill types. 
Our preferred method draws on a recent contribution by Bond and Söderbom (2005) 
which examines the estimation of a model of a Cobb Douglas production function 
when inputs with differential adjustment costs are optimally chosen. In our context we 
make the plausible assumption that the hospital faces larger adjustment costs from 
changing the number of physicians relative to adjusting the number of nurses. Under 
reasonable parameterizations of the adjustment cost process lags of the endogenous 
variables will be correlated with current values and this can be used to justify the 
moment conditions underlying the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator as applied in 
the production function context (e.g. Blundell and Bond, 2000). Essentially this 
estimator builds on the traditional moment conditions that lagged levels of the 
endogenous variables can be used to instrument the first differenced endogenous 
variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991). By (testable) assumptions on the initial 
conditions the system GMM approach also allows lagged differences to be used as 
instruments for the equation in levels. The approach allows the current employment of 
all skill groups to be affected by shocks to productivity (i.e. endogenous in the 
production function). We compare the GMM approach to alternative methods of 
estimating equation (8) by long differences and by OLS in levels.  
 
The hospital quality equation is estimated in a symmetric way to the production 
function. Our measure of quality is death rates following admission for emergency 
heart attacks (AMI) by individuals 55 years and over (the reasons for the choice of 
this variable is discussed below). All the coefficients are allowed to differ as indicated 
by the “D” superscript: 
 
D
it
D
t
D
i
D
it
O
it
D
it
DNURSES
it
DPHYS
it
D
it
D
it ZWWSSND ντηθϕδββµ ++++++++= '21 lnlnlnlnln
                    (9) 
The Z vector includes AMI specific controls for case-mix.  
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D. Placebo experiments on other industries 
A concern with interpreting the coefficient on the outside wage as the effects of 
regulation is that there may be other unobservables correlated with both hospital 
performance and the outside wage. A test of this is to conduct a placebo experiment 
and estimate the model in other industries where pay is not regulated. If the outside 
wage also had a significant effect on firm performance in these sectors we would 
conclude that regulation was not generating our results in the hospital sector.  
 
We conduct one placebo experiment on nursing homes for elderly people. This sector 
employs many nurses whose wages are not regulated by the Pay Review Bodies, so it 
seems a good comparator. We also estimated firm panel models of productivity 
separately for 42 separate service industries, most of which have a large proportion of 
female workers. These were all the three-digit 1987 US Standard Industrial 
Classification codes 53 through 60 and 71 through 81 (we excluded only the public 
sector and the predominantly male construction sector).   
 
E. Selection Issues 
A concern with equation (9) is that there may be unobservable patient characteristics 
correlated with the outside wage that make it more likely for AMI death rates to be 
higher. Although this could in principle be a problem, we argue that our research 
design and robustness tests indicate that selection is not contaminating our results. 
 
(i) Research Design 
We argued in the Introduction that our research design makes selection much less than 
it would in a study on US data. The key outcome is in-hospital death rates from 
emergency admissions.  Incentives for patients to select hospitals were minimal or 
non-existent in the time period we study. Treatment is free at the point of use so 
quality is the only dimension patients would make a choice on. But there was almost 
no public information on hospital quality until after 200117, so during the period we 
study patients (and their doctors and buyers of health care) had almost no quality 
information on which to choose hospitals. Further, patient choice was not encouraged. 
                                                 
17 There were no published indicators of quality available until 1999, when six were published. More 
were made available from 2001.  
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There is no private sector hospital care for emergency AMI in the UK. Finally, 
patients having heart attacks are not in a position to make a choice of hospital (Volpp 
et al 2003). 
 
Any incentives to select will therefore come from the hospital side. But during this 
period, incentives for hospitals to choose patients were also weak. As there was no 
data on quality, hospitals were not monitored on their clinical performance. So on 
performance grounds they had little incentive to refuse potentially sicker patients. 
Hospitals were not paid per patient, but received a block budget for emergency care. 
So in theory they had greater financial incentives to turn away high cost patients than 
in a system where reimbursement rates are (at least to some extent) adjusted for 
severity (for example the US DRG arrangements). However, the fact that hospitals 
were not paid per patient and all treatment was (and remains) free meant that the 
financial systems in NHS hospitals were not set up to identify high cost patients18. We 
conclude that, in practice, incentives for hospitals to select or to engage in differential 
treatment of sicker patients were very weak in the period we study. 
 
(ii) Controls for patient quality 
Although we believe our research design makes selection issues less of a concern, it 
does not eliminate them. To tackle the problem we introduce a large number of 
controls for patient co-morbidity. First, we include in all regressions controls for 
casemix such as the age and gender composition of emergency AMI admissions in a 
particular hospital in a particular year. Second, we condition on mortality rates in the 
local area which should pick up other unobservable influences on death rates from ill 
health. Third, we present estimates controlling for unobservable hospital fixed effects. 
Finally, in robustness checks we also condition on information on the severity of the 
AMI admissions. 
 
                                                 
18 There are large fixed costs with introducing such a patient monitoring system and, in the absence of 
strong incentives, hospitals did not use them. As evidence of this, when a cost per patient 
reimbursement system was introduced in England three years after the end of our data in 2004, two 
years had to be allowed between its introduction and full roll-out. 
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(iii) Business cycle effects on demand for health 
Recently it has been suggested that population heart attack fatalities are positively 
correlated with the business cycle. For example, Ruhm (2006) argues that there is a 
greater number of heart attacks during “good times” using US state level 
unemployment rates.  It is therefore possible that the impact of high outside wages 
that we find is not due to the result of nurse shortages within hospitals, but to 
increases in fatalities due to the business cycle. While possible, there are several 
reasons why our results seem unlikely to be driven by the effect of the business cycle 
on population health. First, the group which appears to suffer most from falls in 
unemployment during cyclical upturns is those aged 20 to 44. We examine fatalities 
of persons aged 55 and over. Second, any relationship between business cycles and 
population health is likely to be affected by institutions (Ruhm 2006, Gerdtham and 
Ruhm 2002). The UK has a stronger welfare state and higher levels of labor 
protection relative to the US. These may limit the mechanisms by which it is 
hypothesized that upswings translate into heart attack fatalities. One mechanism is the 
impact of increased hours and reduced leisure, which it is argued leads to less 
investment in health production by younger workers and less time to care for older 
persons.  Hours are significantly less associated with the cycle in the UK than the US 
(Gali 2005). So there may be less cyclicality of health investment (we present 
evidence that this is the case below)19.  We also examine conditioning on health 
related aspects of the local business cycle such as pollution. 
 
We therefore consider it unlikely that a positive association between high outside 
wages and heart attack fatalities in the population outside the hospital drives our 
results. However, as noted above, we use time varying controls for local population 
health to control for any impact of the cycle on the health of those admitted to 
hospitals.  We also undertake an extensive series of robustness checks to attempt to 
establish that a negative relationship between wages and population health is not the 
source of our results. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The indirect caring effect is also likely to be mitigated by the UK social care system that provides 
subsidized care for older persons and acts as a substitute for care from relatives.   
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(iv) Selection prior to hospital arrival or after hospital exit 
Data constraints mean that we do not observe deaths prior to being admitted to 
hospital nor after thirty days in hospital or after leaving the hospital. Lack of data post 
discharge is unlikely to be problem as we discuss in detail in Appendix B. In short, 
98% of AMI deaths occur within thirty days of being admitted to hospital; in fact over 
half of deaths are within the first 48 hours. 
  
The time between heart attack and hospital arrival (“Floor to door”) is in principle 
important. But in our sample period ambulance staff provided little health care for 
AMI victims.  For example, even as late as 2000 only 0.6% of AMI emergencies 
received reperfusion (treatment to stop clotting) from ambulance staff prior to arrival 
at hospital (Birkenhead, 2005). Additionally, we show in the results section there was 
no relationship between the outside wage and time spent in the ambulance (due to, 
say, congestion on the roads). 
III. Data  
 
We have built an original, very rich database with “plant-level” panel information on 
hospital quality, productivity and inputs such as staff skills and patient case mix. This 
was compiled from a large number of mainly administrative data sources that we 
discuss briefly here and in more detail in Appendix B and Tables A1-A3. 
 
A. Basic information 
The unit of observation in this study is the hospital, so all measures are at hospital 
level. We construct a panel data set of NHS hospitals (called “trusts” in the UK20) 
covering the financial years 1995/6 to 2002/3. The panel is unbalanced as the number 
of hospitals changes over the period. In 1995 the number of acute hospitals in our data 
was 234, and fell to 175 in 2002. We focus only on acute hospitals21.  
 
                                                 
20 An NHS “trust” is a financial, managerial and administrative unit and may cover more than one 
physical hospital. It is appropriate to think of a hospital as a firm that may be single plant or multiplant. 
We use the term “hospital” rather than “hospital trust” for expositional convenience. 
21 Non-acute hospitals are a more heterogeneous set (they include mental health and community 
hospitals) and generally do not provide emergency AMI treatment.  
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B. Measures of quality, productivity and casemix 
These are derived from hospital episode statistics (HES) data. We measure quality of 
output by within hospital deaths within thirty days of admission for emergency acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI) for patients aged 55 or over.  AMI was chosen for 
several reasons. First, it is a common condition and the infrastructure used to treat 
AMI is common to other hospital services making it a good general marker of hospital 
quality22. Second, all patients with a recognized AMI are admitted, so there is little 
scope for selection bias to affect the decision of who gets admitted (see the previous 
section). Third, the quality of hospital care has been established to have an important 
effect on survival rates, so there is ample scope for hospitals to affect outcomes 
(Volpp et al, 2003). As an indication, deaths following emergency admission for AMI 
have been published by both US and UK governments as indicators of hospital 
quality. McClellan and Staiger (2000) argue that measures of AMI death rate correlate 
well with other measures of quality.  Fourth, variants of this measure have been used 
widely in studies of hospital quality (starting with Kessler and McClellan, 2000).  
 
We use annual hospital-level averages and, to avoid the problem of variability of rates 
from small denominators, we only undertake analyses using hospitals with at least 150 
emergency AMI admissions per year (results are robust to changes in this threshold).  
 
To allow for differences in case-mix we include three sets of controls. First, we 
control for unobserved hospital fixed effects, which will control for differences in 
case-mix that are constant over time. Second, we control for all-cause time-varying 
mortality of the catchment area of the hospital23 and will pick up the degree of ill 
health of the population that the hospital draws its cases from. Third, we control for 
the age-gender distribution of admissions for emergency AMI: the proportion of 
emergency AMI admissions in five year bands separately for men and women.  
Fourth, in robustness tests we control for more detailed AMI case-mix measures based 
on the severity of the heart attack. Of course, there may remain some time varying, 
within area, unobservable that increases AMI death rates that are not captured by area 
                                                 
22 Many of the actions to reduce deaths from emergency admissions for AMI need to be taken soon 
after an attack, and so the performance of a hospital in terms of AMI reflects the performance of its 
accident and emergency department. Around half the patients admitted to an acute English hospital are 
admitted through the accident and emergency department. 
23 Constructed from data on 354 Local authorities and standardized for age and gender. 
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mortality rates or the other observables. However, this unobservable would have to be 
systematically positively correlated with outside wages in order to bias our results.  
 
Productivity is measured in a way similar to labor productivity in studies of other 
sectors, as total output per worker. Our measure of total output is finished consultant 
episodes (FCEs). This is a standard output measure used in the NHS and indicates the 
total volume of medical activity (e.g. Vita 1990).  To allow for variation in case mix, 
we again control for hospital fixed effects and for the age-gender profile of total 
admissions at hospital level and type of admission24. In robustness tests we include 
further controls for the case-mix of total admissions using an index based on the costs 
of the procedures and diagnoses of all inpatient admissions. 
 
C. Wages 
We use several measures of outside wages. Our main measure is derived from the 
New Earnings Survey (NES), which is a one per cent sample of all employees in 
Great Britain covering about 300,000 individuals a year. The NES is mandatory 
administrative panel data provided by firms to the Department of Work and Pensions 
and contains information on earnings and hours. Our main measure is average annual 
earnings, but we also consider hourly wages. We use the area code in the NES to 
construct seventy-eight distinct county-based travel to work areas (or boroughs in 
London). Using the zipcodes (“postcodes”) of the headquarters of county councils, we 
matched each NHS hospital to all county councils that fell within a twenty-kilometer 
radius from the hospital. The local area wage is constructed as the average of the 
county wages of all the councils that fell into this radius. Where no councils fell 
within the twenty kilometer radius the wage applicable to the nearest council was 
used25. 
Our main measure is the average wages of non-manual female workers since the 
overwhelming bulk of nurses are women26. The nature of the NHS means physicians’ 
                                                 
24 The proportion of admissions in eighteen five-year age bands for males and females separately plus 
the proportion of admissions in three categories: emergencies, electives, transfers (omitted category is 
elective).  
25 About one quarter of trusts had no council within a twenty kilometer (thirteen mile) radius. Almost 
half of the trusts had only one council within a twenty kilometre radius from the trust, with the 
remaining quarter having two or more councils.  
26 As an alternative to the NES we also considered the Labor Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a self-
reported household survey containing about 320,000 individuals per year (with 80,000 observations on 
wages). From the LFS we can extract spatial wage differentials conditioning on more characteristics to 
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labor markets are national in scope and so local outside wages will be less important 
for this group. Our main measure of the inside wage is simply the average wage paid 
to clinical workers in the hospital, derived from staff numbers and expenditure data27.  
 
 
D. Skill Groups 
We define three clinical skill groups: physicians, qualified nurses (including qualified 
Allied Healthcare Professionals, AHPS, such as radiologists and physiotherapists), 
and health care assistants (including unqualified nurses and allied health 
professionals). Extensive checks show that our results are not sensitive to the 
summation over the qualified and unqualified. The staff measures are annual whole 
time equivalents.  We define total clinical staffing as the sum of staffing across these 
groups. Shares for each group of staff are defined relative to this measure28.  
IV. Preliminary data description 
 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum for the 
variables used in the regression analysis for our sample of hospitals. On average, 
21.1% of emergency heart attack admissions die within thirty days with a wide range 
from as few as 7% to as many as 37%. The average acute hospital is large with just 
under 1,700 clinical workers.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
build up the outside wage offered to a “typical” nurse. We experimented with such measures that 
successfully predict labor supply problems in the cross section (e.g. Elliot et al, 2007). The smaller 
sample size and sampling variation, however, means that such constructed variables are less useful in a 
panel data analysis. So for the most part, we rely on the larger sample sizes of the NES that has less 
measurement error as it is taken directly from employer records. We also experimented with using 
measures of unemployment rates and employment rates as alternative indicators of labor market 
“tightness”. We did not find that these added explanatory power over and above the information in the 
wage, which in principle should fully reflect labor market conditions. 
27 A problem with a measure of average wages is that it may reflect the skill mix, such as differential 
grades within the hospital (as discussed above in the econometric section). We therefore also 
experimented with a more exogenous measure of the price of labor based on the predicted regional 
wage for a nurse following the method of Gosling and Van Reenen (2006). We use mandated wage 
uprating by the National Pay Review Body (which has an area and grade specific component) to 
calculate the predicted wage increase for an average nurse in the trust using the regional characteristics 
based on the NES. The results are similar to those reported here and are available on request. 
28 We also have a total employment measure that includes the non-clinical staff, but this does not 
disaggregate between highly skilled groups such as senior managers and less skilled groups such as 
janitors. Consequently, our main results use total clinical staff as the main employment measure and we 
check the robustness of the results to conditioning on the total employment measure (see Table 6). 
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A. Variation of AMI rate and productivity over time 
Figure 3 presents the distribution of AMI deaths between 1995 and 2002.  We show 
the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles of the distribution.  The most striking feature 
of Figure 3 is the remarkable variation of death rates at any point in time between 
different hospitals. For example in 1995 the death rate is s17% for the bottom decile 
and 27% in the top decile. Some of this variation can be accounted for by case mix 
but there remains much residual variation that is potentially related to the quantity and 
quality of labor inputs. Looking at the evolution of the distribution, Figure 3 shows a 
gradual decrease in death rate over time indicating the long run trend in a decline in 
the emergency AMI death rate.  There is some convergence in death rates between 
hospitals at the top and bottom of the distribution towards the end of the period. This 
convergence and the falls in 2002 follow a major government initiative to reduce the 
incidence of coronary heart disease through the “National Service Framework”29. 
Although this is a genuine feature of the data we dropped 2002 to avoid any 
contamination of the main results because of this major policy initiative30. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of productivity which shows a large dispersion 
some 60% between the top and bottom deciles in 1995. This heterogeneity mirrors the 
well-known findings in the productivity literature that has looked at differences 
between private sector firms: there is significant and persistent variation in 
productivity even within disaggregated sectors that cannot be explained by observable 
factor inputs. The figure also shows clearly the lack of a positive trend in our measure 
of productivity. 
 
B. Outside wages and outcomes: vacancies, labor supply and AMI death rates 
In Figure 5 we display the geographical variation in outside wages, the intensity of 
use of temporary agency nurses and AMI death rates to see if the raw data suggest the 
relationships we have been discussing. There is considerable spatial variation in all 
three measures. The similarity in patterns between the distribution of outside wages 
and intensity of agency nurses is particularly striking, being concentrated heavily in 
                                                 
29 The framework set new standards and protocols, backed by increased resources and incentives. See 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/books/minap/HowHospitalsManageHeartAttacks12Nov2002.pdf. 
After 2001 there were also other reforms to improve NHS performance, which included tougher targets 
for waiting times in Emergency Rooms (see Friedman and Kelman, 2006, for an analysis). 
30 The results are stronger if we include this year.  
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London and other urban centers with stronger labor markets. The pattern in AMI 
deaths is slightly different, reflecting amongst other things, the distribution of 
population ill-health which is higher in areas of greater poverty such as the North 
East. Nevertheless there is considerable overlap in the regional distribution of AMI 
deaths and that of outside wages and use of agency staff. 
 
We now examine some simple correlations across regions. First we plot the mean 
outside wage against the nurse vacancy rate in Figure 6 across the ten English regions. 
A clear upward sloping pattern emerges with the highest outside wage area (London) 
having a vacancy rate that is fourfold higher than the vacancy rate in the lowest 
outside wage area (the North East). Gosling and Van Reenen (2005) discuss the 
correlation between nurse labor supply measured as the proportion of women with a 
nursing qualification who are employed as nurses (rather than being employed in 
another occupation or not participating). They show that labor supply is much lower 
in the regions where outside wages are higher. In Inner London, for example, nurse 
wages are about 5% lower than the regional average outside wage, whereas in the 
North East of England nurses’ wages are 30% higher than the outside wage. In 
London the nurse participation is 50% and in the North East participation rates are 
75%31.   
 
Figure 7 examines the intensity of using agency nurses and the outside wage. Again, 
we find that the regions with high outside wages rely a lot more on agency nurses than 
the regions with low outside wages. Figure 8 plots the AMI death rate as a function of 
the regional outside wage. There appears to be a positive relationship, London having 
the highest AMI death rates and the low-outside wage regions of the North having 
lower AMI death rates. In Figure 9 we consider these variables in growth rates over 
the five-year period in our sample. Again, it appears that there is a positive 
relationship between the change in the outside wage and the growth rate of AMI. 
Although all areas have had some improvement in the quality of hospitals as 
                                                 
31 It cannot be concluded from this simple comparison that nurses outside London are earning quasi-
rents from the public sector so that the regulated wage is above the unregulated wage in Figure 1. This 
is because the comparison does not take into account non-pecuniary aspects of being a nurse, which 
may be an unattractive occupation for many people. These non-pecuniary aspects are likely to be 
relatively stable over time, however, so econometrically we control for them with fixed effects. 
  24
measured by AMI death rates, the rate of improvement was fastest in those regions 
with the slowest increase in outside wages. 
 
Overall then, regions with high outside wages are characterized by higher vacancy 
rates, greater use of temporary agency staff and higher death rates from AMI32.  There 
are, of course, many reasons why these figures may be misleading and there is no 
causal connection between high outside wages and poor hospital performance. For 
example, there may be many other factors positively influencing the outside wage and 
the AMI death that we have not controlled for. To tackle this we turn to the 
econometric results where we look at within region variation both in the cross section 
(by using area and hospital trust level data) and in the time series (by controlling for 
hospital fixed effects) as well as conditioning on confounding variables such as 
casemix and local mortality rates. 
 
V. Main results  
 
In this section we present our main results looking at the effect of outside wages on 
hospital quality and productivity. We then consider including inside wages, the 
magnitudes of the effects, and the role of agency nurses, our placebo tests and other 
robustness results. 
 
A. Hospital quality as measured by death rates from AMI 
Table 2 presents the estimates for hospital quality as measured by the log of the AMI 
death rate. The outside wage is that derived from the log of the average wage of non-
manual women in the seventy-eight local “travel to work” areas. Column (1) presents 
the pooled OLS estimates of the association of AMI death rates with staff shares and 
outside wages, controlling for AMI casemix (admissions in fourteen age-gender 
bands), hospital type (i.e. whether the hospital was a normal acute hospital or a 
                                                 
32 These results fit with Gosling and Van Reenen (2005), who use a long panel of regions between 1984 
and 2001 (when there were some significant changes in mandated regional differences) to find a 10% 
fall in nurse relative wages reduces nurse employment by up to 15%. Elliott et al (2007) find a positive 
cross sectional relationship between vacancies and high outside wages. 
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teaching hospital), the local area mortality rates, hospital size (the log of total clinical 
employees), year dummies and ten regional dummies33.  
 
Column (1) of Table 2 confirms that the bivariate correlation in Figures 8 and 9, 
which showed that higher outside wages are associated with higher AMI death rates34, 
remains robust after adding controls. A 10% increase in outside pay is associated with 
a 4% increase in AMI death rates. It also reveals that hospitals with better qualified 
employees (i.e. a higher proportion of physicians and/or qualified nurses relative to 
health care assistants) have lower AMI death rates. The coefficients are sensible being 
larger for physician share (the highest human capital group) compared to nurse share. 
Nevertheless, even after controlling for skill mix, the outside wage enters the 
regression with a significantly positive sign. 
 
Note that the standard errors are clustered by hospital. An alternative is to cluster by 
area, but the standard errors were extremely close to those presented here, due to the 
large number of areas35.  
 
Column (2) of Table 2 considers long-differenced specifications (annualized three 
year differences)36. The patterns of signs on the key variables are the same as OLS in 
levels, but less precisely determined. The coefficient on the outside wage is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. The skill share variables are correctly signed but 
smaller in magnitude37. Finally, column (3) contains our preferred system GMM 
                                                 
33 The results were robust to including other measures of hospital size as extra controls (e.g. number of 
finished consultant episodes, total number of beds or the total admissions). These terms were never 
significantly different from zero. 
34 Note that we also considered other health quality outcomes that showed similar patterns to those 
reported here for AMI. For example, if we use death from strokes as the dependent variable in an 
equivalent specification to column (1) the coefficient on outside pay is 0.475 with a standard error of 
0.191. The coefficient on physician share was -2.305 with a standard error of 0.513. 
35 The area-level clustered standard error on the outside wage in column (1) of Table 2 was 0.170 (as 
compared to 0.176 when we cluster by firm). For productivity, the area-level clustered standard error 
on the outside wage in column (1) of Table 3 was 0.199 (as compared to 0.198) when we cluster by 
firm. See Bertrand et al (2004) or Cameron et al (2007) for a recent discussion of these issues. 
36 We focus on long-differences to reduce the attenuation bias associated with transitory measurement 
error. Including a full set of hospital dummies (within groups) leads to similar marginal effects with 
larger standard errors. For example the coefficient on the outside wage in an identical specification to 
column (1) estimated by within groups is 0.433 with a standard error of 0.324. 
37 Running the regressions using five year differences also lead to strong results: the coefficient on the 
outside wage was 1.718 with a standard error of 0.707. Note that the casemix variables were jointly 
insignificant in the long-differences specifications so we do not include them (p-value of joint 
significance is 0.353). 
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specification that treats skill shares and total employment as endogenous. This 
estimator exploits the “within” information used in columns (2) and the levels 
information used in column (1). The marginal effect of the outside wage is 
statistically significant and similar in magnitude to column (1). The coefficients on the 
skill shares are significant and larger in absolute magnitude compared to the previous 
columns. This suggests some endogeneity bias of the coefficients on skill shares, 
possibly because hospitals with high AMI rates rely on skilled staff to a greater extent, 
which biases the OLS coefficients on the skill shares towards zero. 
 
The diagnostics are given at the base of Table 2. For the instrumental variables to be 
valid for system GMM there should be no second order serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals and no correlation of the error term with the instruments. The 
high p-values on the LM(2) and Sargan test are consistent with the validity of the 
instrument set38. 
 
B. Hospital Productivity  
Table 3 repeats the analysis on the same sample as Table 2 but uses productivity as 
the dependent variable.  The order of the specifications is identical to Table 2 and the 
control variables are the same except we use the vector of case mix controls specific 
to total admissions. Column (1) shows that the share of physicians is significantly and 
positively associated with higher productivity, while the share of nurses is also 
positive, but statistically insignificant. Most importantly, higher outside pay is 
associated with significantly lower productivity. A 10% increase in outside pay is 
associated with a 6.6% decrease in productivity. 
 
The long-differenced results are much weaker with no variable significant, possibly 
reflecting the low degree of within-hospital variation in productivity. The final 
column of Table 3 presents the preferred GMM results. Here, all three key variables 
                                                 
38 The p-value of the Sargan-Difference test of the invalidity of the extra moment conditions used by 
the Blundell and Bond estimator (compared to the standard moment condition of Arellano and Bond, 
1991) is 0.973. This implies the additional moments are not rejected, justifying the more efficient 
estimation technique.  
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are correctly signed and significant. The magnitudes of outside pay and physician 
share are similar to OLS, but the coefficient on qualified nurse share is larger39.  
 
In summary, and taking both tables together, we have two key results. First, a richer 
skill mix, in particular using more physicians, appears to have a positive association 
with the quality and quantity of hospital output. This is what basic human capital 
theory would predict although, to our knowledge, this has not been demonstrated 
before in the health sector. Secondly, and more interestingly, higher outside wages 
tend to depress the quality and productivity of hospitals. This is a more controversial 
finding. In particular, we find that these outside wage effects exist even after 
conditioning on skill inputs, so the outside wage coefficient is not simply reflecting a 
lower quantity of key staff. We consider the other mechanisms through which external 
labor markets may be having an effect on hospital quality and productivity below. 
 
C. Inside Wages 
According to our model, effort, quality and labor supply are determined by the 
comparison between the inside wage in the hospital and the outside wage in the labor 
market. We first have focused on the outside wage because of the relatively small 
exogenous variation in the inside wage for a comparable nursing grade.  In Table 4 we 
look at this in more detail by re-running all the specifications in Tables 2 and 3 
conditioning on the inside wage (the average clinical wage in the hospital).  
 
Column (1) of Table 4 includes the inside wage in the OLS AMI death rate 
regressions. The marginal effect of inside wages is negative as expected - higher 
inside wages are associated with a significant reduction in AMI death rates. The 
coefficient on outside wages remains very similar to Table 2 and remains significant. 
The coefficients on the skills share terms do fall, however, and they are no longer 
statistically significant. This suggests that the inside wage reflects, at least partially, 
the different skill mix within a hospital. Similar results are observed in column (2) for 
long differences and column (3) for GMM.  
 
                                                 
39 The Hansen-Sargan test rejects the validity of the instruments in this column. In the next sub-section 
we show that this is due to misspecification – the omission of inside wages. 
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The final three columns of Table 4 use productivity as the dependent variable. In 
contrast to the AMI regressions, the skill share terms dominate the inside wage in the 
OLS productivity regression of column (4). The strongest evidence is in the GMM 
results of column (6) where we find a positive and significant coefficient on the inside 
wage – a 10% increase in hospital pay is associated with a 2.5% increase in 
productivity. Outside wages remain negative and highly significant, however.  The 
Hansen-Sargan test no longer rejects at the 5% level suggesting that the main 
diagnostic problems of Table 3 were related to the omission of inside wages.  
 
Overall, we find some suggestive evidence that inside wages matter for hospital 
performance, but identifying their effects is much harder than the effect of the outside 
wage. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the outside wage, our key variable of interest, 
remains robust to conditioning on the inside wage. 
 
D. Magnitudes 
The results appear to be statistically significant, but are they economically significant? 
A 10% increase in the outside wages (holding the inside wage and labor inputs fixed) 
is associated with a 4.6% increase in death rates (Table 2 column (3)). The decile ratio 
of outside wages between areas in 1996 was about 33%, so a move from the worst to 
best decile of labor markets is associated with a 15.2% increase in death rates. Thus a 
gap of this size could account for just over one quarter of the 60% quality spread in 
the 90-10. A 10% increase in outside wages is associated with a 5.5% fall in 
productivity (Table 3 column (3)). Moving from the best to worst decile of labor 
markets is associated with an 18.2% increase in productivity, which is just under a 
third of the 60% between hospital productivity spread. 
 
We can also compare our estimates of the impact of the labor market with those for 
specific medical interventions for AMIs.  Our estimates suggest a 10% increase in the 
outside wage is associated with just under a five per cent increase in death rates, 
which is about a one percentage point increase at the mean death rate of 21% in our 
data. Heidenriech and McClellan (2001) estimate that the effect of increasing the use 
of aspirins in treatment of AMI patients in the US by 70 percentage points (from 5 to 
75 percent) was a fall of 3.3 percentage points in death rates; the effect of increasing 
the use of thrombolytics from 0 to 31 percent was a 1.6 percentage point fall; and the 
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effect of increasing use of beta blockers from 21% to 50% was a 0.6 percentage point 
fall. Austin and Mamdami (2006) estimate that prescription of statins at discharge 
reduced three-year mortality by 2.1 to 4.5 percentage points.   
 
Of course, although these show benefits, the costs of different policy interventions are 
very different. Back of the envelope calculations (see Appendix C) show that in terms 
of life-years saved, raising wages is much more costly compared with pharmaceutical 
interventions. We calculate that there is an implied value of a life-year of $100,000 
from raising wages compared to the $50,000-$100,000 generally used in US cost-
effectiveness studies (see Skinner et al, 2006)40. 
 
Although across the board increases in the level of wages are not cost-effective, 
changes in the regulation to allow the structure of nurse wages to reflect local labor 
market conditions are more beneficial. We return to this in the Conclusion. 
 
E. What is the mechanism through which higher outside wages affect hospital 
outcomes? The role of temporary agency staff 
The estimates above show that quality and quantity of hospital output are negatively 
associated with the outside labor market wage. We have interpreted the coefficient on 
the outside wage as reflecting worker quality. We now examine whether alternative 
measures of staff quality are directly associated with outside wages and clinical 
outcomes. The channel we examine is the possible greater reliance on temporary 
agency staff in high outside wage areas.  If agency staff have lower general or 
hospital-specific human capital they may depress hospital outcomes41.  
 
We have information available to construct a measure of the intensity to which 
hospitals rely on nursing agency staff for a sub-sample of the data. We use the 
proportion of total staff costs accounted for by agency nurses as our indicator in Table 
5 (“Agency”). The first column reports regressions of this measure of intensity of use 
of agency nurses on the outside pay rate (and other controls). There is a highly 
significant correlation, suggesting that agency nurses are more commonly used in the 
                                                 
40 In the UK the National Institute of Clinical Excellence uses a figure of $60,000. 
41 In a related literature, several recent papers (e.g. Autor and Houseman, 2005) have suggested that 
temporary jobs are not “stepping stones” to better careers which is consistent with the notion that 
workers build up little human capital in these positions. 
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high outside wage areas. Column (2) then includes the agency term directly in a 
hospital AMI death rate regression identical to our preferred model (this is column (3) 
of Table 4)42. A greater use of agency staff is associated with significantly higher 
death rates in hospitals; a doubling of the intensity of use of agency staff is associated 
with a 5.7% increase in the death rate. Column (3) simply repeats the preferred 
specification on the sub-sample with non-missing agency nurse information with only 
outside wages for comparison purposes. The results are very similar to the larger 
sample. Then column (4) presents a “horse race” with both agency and outside wage 
measures entered simultaneously. The outside wage coefficient falls to almost half of 
its value in the previous column and is no longer significant at even the 10% level. 
The coefficient on the agency variable also falls but it remains significant at the 10% 
level. This suggests that an important part of the way that the outside labor market is 
affecting hospital quality is through a greater reliance on temporary agency workers.  
In support of this finding, detailed analysis of the payroll data of a small number of 
hospitals indicates that agency staff are disproportionately deployed in emergency 
rooms (known as accident and emergency departments in the UK), through which 
emergency AMI cases are admitted.43 
 
The next three columns of Table 5 repeat the experiment but use productivity instead 
of AMI death rates as an outcome measure. In column (5) we show that a greater use 
of agency staff is associated with significantly lower productivity. Column (6) shows 
that the marginal effect of the outside wage on productivity is significant in the sub-
sample where we have agency staff information (although somewhat larger in 
magnitude). In column (7) where we condition on agency intensity the magnitude of 
the outside wage coefficient falls by about 10% of its value in the previous column, 
but remains significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on agency staffing has fallen 
by about half but remains significant at the 1% level44.  
                                                 
42 We treat the agency variable as the other endogenous hospital-level variables like physician share 
and instrument it with past values in the GMM approach. 
43 There are no published breakdowns of where agency staff are deployed within NHS hospitals. 
Analysis of detailed payroll data of fourteen NHS Trusts (data used in Crilly et al, 2007) shows the 
share of agency staff expenditure accounted for by Accident and Emergency departments averages 
9.1%. This is around twice the share of total nursing staff spend in Accident and Emergency 
departments (4.7%) and is higher than the share of total nursing staff costs accounted for by agency 
staff (7.9%).  
44 We also re-estimated Table 5 by OLS and GMM excluding the inside wage and the results are 
similar.  
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To further explore the role of agency staff, we examine whether there is a link 
between agency staffing and a specific adverse medical outcome that is a major 
problem in UK hospitals.  Since 2001 acute NHS hospitals in England have been 
subject to mandatory reporting of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
bacteraemias (bloodstream infections)45. This is known in the media as the MRSA 
“Superbug”. It has been argued that hospital acquired infections are associated with 
hospital physical cleanliness. For the UK, it has been hypothesized that greater 
reliance on agency nurses may be associated with higher rates of MRSA. Temporary 
nurses may be less knowledgeable about local infection control policies, and move 
around more between wards within hospitals as well as switching between hospitals. 
This implies a greater number of patient contacts per agency nurse, and patients on 
wards with higher numbers of temporary staff may come into contact with more staff, 
since temporary workers often work shorter shifts than permanent workers.  
 
MRSA data is only available for 2001 and 2002. For these years we regressed MRSA 
rates against agency staff intensity controlling for the same variables as in Table 2 
column (1). Consistent with McCormick et al (2007) we found a positive and 
significant association between levels of MRSA rates and use of agency staff (a 
coefficient of 0.015 with a robust standard error of 0.006).  
 
Taken as a whole, these results are suggestive that agency staffing may be part of the 
mechanism through which higher outside wages negatively affect hospital outcomes.  
 
F. Placebo Tests: No role for the outside wage in other sectors 
A concern with our results is that the effects of the outside wage may be due to some 
other factor than pay regulation. If this were so we would also expect outside wages to 
affect performance in other sectors that had similar characteristics to hospitals. In this 
section we conduct several placebo experiments to show that our outside wage 
measure is not systematically correlated with performance in these sectors. We look at 
one sector in depth and then consider 42 other private sector service industries. 
                                                 
45 Stapylococcus Aureas (SA) are bacteria commonly carried on the skin and it is estimated around 
30% of the population of the UK carries SA bacteria at any one time. SA bacteria can cause serious 
infections such as surgical wound infections and pneumonia. Bacteraemia infections occur when the 
MRSA enters a normally sterile bloodstream either through an intravenous catheter or a local site of 
infection.   
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We first consider nursing homes for senior citizens. Health care workers are employed 
intensively in this sector which provides both medical and “hospitality” services for 
elderly people on a long-term basis. Unlike hospitals, however, firms are free to set 
wages without being constrained by a centralized regulated nursing wage. Firm-level 
panel data for 1998 and 1999 was collected for 649 randomly selected nursing homes 
which included extensive characteristics46. One measure of labor productivity specific 
to this sector is the number of occupied beds per hour worked. This does not take into 
account the differential quality of nursing homes, so our baseline results use revenues 
per hour – this weights raw productivity figure by the price charged to stay in the 
home (under the assumption that the higher quality nursing homes are more 
expensive). We compare this with the beds per hour measure as well. 
 
Table 6 contains the results. The key variable of interest is exactly the same as in the 
earlier tables; the outside wage in the local labor market. We also control for the 
average wage in the home (the inside wage), the proportion of employees who have 
nursing qualifications, overall firm size (employment), gender composition,  average 
worker age, the proportion of residents subsidized by the government, regional 
dummies and year dummies. In column (1) we report the basic results that show that 
the inside wage is positive and significant (which could represent either unobserved 
skills or efficiency wages). More importantly, the outside wage term although 
negative is completely insignificant. Column (2) includes average hours as an 
additional control since wages may affect hours worked (the denominator of the 
dependent variable). The coefficient on the outside wage remains insignificant and 
actually becomes positive. In 1999 the UK introduced a national minimum wage so 
this constrained firms to pay a legal minimum. To make sure that this is not 
contaminating our results we re-estimate on the 1998 cross section only in column (3) 
and again the outside wage is insignificant47. In column (4) we include a full set of 
firm fixed effects. Although the inside wage remains positive and significant the 
outside wage remains insignificant. Finally, in column (5) we use output per hour 
                                                 
46  See Appendix B and Machin and Wilson (2004) for a more detailed data description 
47 We also constructed the wage “gap” – the proportion that the 1998 wage bill in the home would have 
to increase in order to comply with the minimum wage law. This is highly correlated with subsequent 
wage growth. The outside wage term remains insignificant when the “gap” is included as an additional 
variable. 
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instead of revenue per hour as the dependent variable without changing the qualitative 
results. 
 
We also examined production functions from a number of other service industries 
where there were many female employees. In contrast to the US, all UK firms are 
legally required to lodge their accounts in Companies’ House and, if they are above a 
minimum size threshold, legally obliged to report their wage bill, employment, sales 
and other characteristics (even if they are not listed on the Stock market). This data is 
available electronically through BVD’s Amadeus Dataset (see Appendix B for details) 
and we exploit this to run panel data regressions of labor productivity (ln(revenues per 
worker)) on the outside wage. We mimic the same three specifications of Table 3 
(OLS, long-differences and system GMM) including as additional controls the inside 
wage, ln(employment), the ln(capital-labor ratio), regional and year dummies. The 
full results for these 126 regressions (three specifications in forty-two industries) are 
summarized in Appendix Table A4. In only seven cases was the coefficient on the 
outside wage negative and significant at the 5% level (5.6% of the total number of 
regressions), which is what would be expected by pure chance given the large number 
of regressions.  
 
Taken together, these results from sectors where there are no maximum pay limits 
suggests that the negative effect of outside wages is limited to the hospital sector. The 
absence of such a placebo effect in the other industries strongly suggests that it is 
regulation which is causing the results rather than some other unobserved factor. 
 
VI. Robustness of the results 
We describe here a sample of the large number of robustness checks we performed on 
the main results. These are summarized in Table 7. All cells report the coefficient and 
standard error on the outside wage from separate regressions. The first column has 
AMI death rates as the dependent variable and the second column has productivity as 
the dependent variable. Both columns include the inside wage. We begin in row 1 
with a baseline regression taken from Table 4 columns (3) and (6). The other 
regressions use this as the baseline in the rest of the table.  
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A. Severity of AMI cases and the local labor market 
As discussed above, Ruhm (2006) has suggested that a booming local labor market 
could increase ill health and the incidence of heart attacks and has presented US 
evidence to support this hypothesis48. We have sought to deal with co-morbidity 
through an extensive set of demographic controls, area mortality rates and hospital 
fixed effects. But it is possible there are still omitted casemix variables and that a 
positive correlation between economic activity and severity of patients admitted that 
is driving our results. We test the robustness of our results to this idea in a number of 
ways. 
 
First, we examine whether the severity of those admitted with AMI is associated with 
outside wages. Using HES data we calculated the proportion of emergency AMI cases 
that were admitted “with complications” compared to the total49. Regressing this AMI 
case severity measure on the outside wage and all the variables in a specification like 
column (1) of Table 2 shows that there is no significant association with outside 
wages50.  We then include this measure of AMI casemix severity directly in the AMI 
death rate regressions (row 2 of Table 7). In simple OLS specifications - as in Table 2 
column (1) - the coefficient on this variable took the expected positive sign and was 
statistically significant (0.262 with a standard error of 0.116) when we omitted our 
demographic controls. When the demographic controls were included, the extra co-
morbidity variable was positive but insignificant (in OLS or in GMM). This suggests 
that our included demographics are doing a good job at reflecting casemix. The 
marginal effect of the outside wage was very similar when the extra casemix variable 
was included as shown in the first column of row 2. 
 
As a robustness check for the productivity regressions we use a casemix variable 
based on the severity of all admissions to each hospital. This index, known as the 
reference cost index, is derived from all admissions to the hospital as classified by 
                                                 
48 Note our outcome measure differs from the population AMI rates in Ruhm (2006). Our measure is 
the death rate conditional on having a heart attack. So Ruhm’s effect of strong labor markets causing 
more heart attacks is distinct from our measure of hospital quality.  
49 We constructed this ratio from the proportion of emergency patients 55 years or older admitted with 
HRG codes E11 (AMI with complications) and E12 (AMI without complications). For discussion of 
HRGs, see Appendix B. 
50 The coefficient on outside wages was 0.001 with a standard error of 0.041. If we drop the time 
dummies, however, the coefficient on the outside wage becomes positive and significant (0.068 with a 
standard error of 0.030), suggesting that it is important to control for omitted aggregate time shocks. 
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Healthcare Resource Group (HRGs are similar to US DRGs, Diagnostic Related 
Groups - see Appendix B). A higher value of the index reflects greater complexity of 
cases. When included in the productivity regressions the relative costs index takes the 
expected sign and is significant (the index has a coefficient of -0.715 and a standard 
error of 0.186). The effect of the outside wage is robust, however, remaining negative 
and significant (row 3 column (2) of Table 7).  
 
Second, we investigate whether outside wages are associated with higher AMI death 
rates at the community level (i.e. in the whole local area both inside and outside 
hospitals). We would expect some positive relationship between community level 
death rates and outside wages as our model implies that local death rates rise because 
of the decline in hospital quality, even though in-hospital deaths only account for a 
minority of local area deaths (Norris et al, 1998). The Ruhm hypothesis suggests a 
strong positive relationship. Taking the local authority as the unit of observation, we 
examine the relationship between (age and gender standardized) AMI death rates and 
our outside pay variable (lagged), controlling for year and local authorities effects for 
1996-200151. We find, as expected, a small positive relationship, but one which is 
insignificantly different from zero. The coefficient on outside pay is 0.04 (standard 
error = 0.17).   
 
The lack of any strong positive relationship between outside wages and AMI fatalities 
at community level is supported by a lack of a positive relationship between outside 
wages and factors that might drive higher community level fatalities. We found no 
significant correlation between increases in outside wages and increase in levels of 
pollution, smoking or obesity, all of which are key risk factors for AMI52. 
 
                                                 
51 There are 354 local authorities in England. These are the primary political level below national level 
in England.  
52 Regressing smoking on outside wages using local authority as the unit of analysis with controls for 
local authority fixed effects and year, we find a coefficient of –0.078 (standard error = 0.120). 
Regressing obesity on outside wages using local authority as the unit of analysis with controls for local 
authority fixed effects and year, we find a coefficient of 0.11 (standard error = 0.11). We examined the 
relationship between four measures of air borne pollutants (carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, 
particulate matter and ozone) and found no evidence of a positive association between pollution and 
outside pay. Instead, the evidence points to a negative association.  
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We conclude that our finding of a positive relationship between in-hospital mortality 
and outside wages seems unlikely to be driven by an association between outside 
wages and poorer health in the area from which the hospital draws its patients. 
 
B. Outside labor markets affecting care in ambulance prior to hospital? 
Medics distinguish two important periods after a heart attack: “floor to door” (from 
having the heart attack to admission to hospital) and “door to needle” (from admission 
to initial treatment – usually injection of an anti-blood clotting agent such as a 
thrombolytic drug). Since our measure of quality is death rates from AMI taken from 
the moment a patient is admitted to hospital, it is possible that the outside wage is 
actually affecting treatment in the floor to door period. Perhaps the most obvious 
mechanism would be that stronger economic activity generates more road congestion 
causing patients to arrive at hospitals later and decreasing their chances of survival. 
To check this we re-estimated AMI equations including an additional control for 
ambulance speeds (the proportion of urgent ambulance journey arriving on time). Our 
outside wages estimates were robust to this control (coefficient of 0.446 with a 
standard error of 0.172) 53. 
 
More subtly, hospitals in high outside wage areas may have higher death rates 
because of the behavior of ambulance crews. If ambulance crews were of poorer 
quality in high outside wage areas (for the same reason as nurse quality is poorer) then 
patients might arrive in hospitals in a worse state and therefore be more likely to die 
in the “door to needle” period. Over our time period, however, there was hardly any 
treatment of heart attack patients in ambulances. For example, in 2000 only 0.6% of 
reperfusion (thrombolytic drugs) for heart attack patients was given before admission 
to hospital in 2000 and 2001 (Birkenhead, 2005). We conclude that poorer treatment 
by ambulance crews in high outside wage areas is unlikely to drive our results.  
 
C. Financial Pressure 
An alternative explanation for the importance of the outside wage is that hospitals in 
stronger local labor markets face sharper budgetary constraints. The British 
government’s funding formula for the health service contains a “market forces factor” 
that allocates more funds to reflect the higher costs in more expensive areas, but it 
                                                 
53 These data are only available as a consistent series for three years in our data. 
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may not fully compensate (e.g. Crilly et al, 2007). Consequently, hospitals in high 
wage areas may be chronically under-funded and this could cause worse quality and 
productivity. To test this idea we included a measure of the hospital’s financial 
surplus (or deficit) as an additional control. In row 3 we show that the coefficient on 
the outside wage remains significant and very similar in magnitude in the sub-sample 
where we have information on a hospital’s financial position. 
 
C. Dynamics and short-run monopsony 
We were concerned that we may have misspecified the econometric model and not 
allowed for sufficient dynamics. The specification in row 4 of Table 7 includes a 
lagged dependent variable (treated as endogenous using the standard GMM approach) 
and presents the long-run effects of outside wages. Although the lagged dependent 
variable was significant, the long-run effects of the outside wage remain significant 
and become slightly larger in absolute magnitude for both equations. The fact that 
there is a long-run effect of outside wages is important and consistent with the cross 
sectional raw data in Figures 6 through 8. Labor supply difficulties in the NHS are not 
simply due to hospitals optimally smoothing their labor force in response to positive 
shocks (due to higher adjustment costs for permanent compared to temporary staff) or 
because of short-run monopsony power as may be the case in the US (see Houseman 
et al, 2003). They appear to be long-term. 
 
D. Regional heterogeneity in effect of outside wage 
According to Figure 1, the high outside wage areas may be affected more by the 
regulated wage than the low cost areas (for example, the regulated wage may be close 
to the unregulated equilibrium wage for the North). Consequently, we would expect a 
larger effect in London than in the rest of the country. We experimented with 
dropping London from the sample in row 5. As we expect, the marginal effects are 
somewhat smaller in this reduced sample for both AMI and productivity, but they 
remain significant at the 5% level. 
 
E. Further Robustness Tests 
We also tried dropping some outliers in the change in the outside wage in row 6 and 
running the regressions only on the balanced panel in row 7. The results are stronger 
than the baseline in these sub-samples. In row 8, we use an alternative measure of the 
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outside wage – the regional wage in each of the ten English regions (i.e. much more 
aggregated than the seventy-eight area outside wages used in our main analysis). The 
marginal effects are larger in magnitude but statistically insignificant unless we drop 
the regional dummies (row 9). This illustrates the importance of using spatially 
disaggregated measures. In row 10 we include a variable measuring total hospital 
employees, including non-clinical workers. The employment variable is insignificant 
and the coefficient on outside wages falls, but is still significant at the 5% level. 
 
One simple concern is that the inclusion of linear skill shares in equation (7) may be 
too restrictive. We relax this by including squares and cross-product terms of the three 
skill groups in row 11. The higher order terms were generally insignificant and the 
coefficients on the outside wage terms remain significant and are larger in absolute 
magnitude. 
 
Overall then, our results appear robust to a wide variety of experiments. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the impact of centralized pay regulation on the performance 
of hospitals. Regulated skill prices offers a useful identification strategy for 
examining the impact of labor markets on organizational performance relative to a 
competitive labor market where wages inside and outside the firm should be 
equalized. Our unusually rich data of a panel of essentially all acute hospitals in 
England allows us to control for a number of confounding influences. 
 
We find that keeping pay flat over heterogeneous local labor markets leads to lower 
hospital performance (as indicated by higher AMI death rates and lower productivity) 
in areas with stronger outside labor markets54. This is not simply because hospitals in 
high outside (relative to inside) wage areas have trouble maintaining high enough 
staffing levels, as we condition on labor inputs. It is more likely to be due to the 
difficulty of retaining high quality staff and/or the lower levels of effort that are 
supplied when outside wages are high. The negative association between firm 
                                                 
54 One of the little-discussed costs of centralized wage setting proposed by some macro-economists 
(e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 2005) are these types of perverse effects on firm productivity. 
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performance and the outside wage is unique to hospitals – we do not find it in the 
other 43 service sectors we examine where their pay is not regulated, such as the 
market for nursing homes for senior citizens. 
 
We show that reliance on temporary agency staff instead of permanent staff is a 
possible mechanism in generating these worse outcomes for hospitals in high outside 
wage areas. This finding is related to the emerging literature on the quality of 
temporary jobs for workers (e.g. Autor and Houseman, 2005).  
 
One further direction we would like to explore is the impact of regulated prices on 
technology adoption (see Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2006). Our setting is useful 
because the external regulation of wages enables us to examine whether part of the 
performance effect comes from the adoption of sub-optimal techniques. We have 
collected data on the management practices and organizational structure of these 
hospitals (using the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) in order to 
understand in more detail the mechanisms generating the extreme variation we 
observe in hospital performance. 
 
From a policy perspective, our study has important implications for regulated labor 
markets. The National Health Service, a quasi-monopoly provider, dominates the UK 
health system and wages for physicians and nurses are determined centrally. The local 
variation of wages does not fully reflect the higher outside wage in areas where the 
labor market is tight (such as London and the South East). The low relative wages in 
these high outside wage areas appear to have a direct impact on the death rates in 
hospitals and the level of their productivity. Rather than focusing on across the board 
increases in national pay which we found not to be cost effective, relaxing the 
regulatory system to allow local wages to reflect local market realities would improve 
productivity and save lives in the higher outside wage areas.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
AMI Variables     
AMI death rate (55 plus) 21.14 4.483 7.454 36.941 
Total AMI deaths (55 plus) 79.99 33.83  13 294 
Total AMI admissions (55 plus) 385.02 160.84 151 1,348 
Productivity and FCE (finished 
Consultant Episodes) 
    
Productivity (total FCEs/ total 
clinical staffing) 
31.17 7.57 12.09 65.12 
Total FCEs 58,664.58 24,515.83 13,490 138,984 
Staffing Variables     
Total clinical staffing (physicians 
+ nurses + Allied Health 
Professionals + Health Care 
Assistants) 
1675.79 692.25 398.61 4010.70 
Physicians share of clinical 
staffing 
0.148 0.030 0.058 0.270 
Qualified Nurses (plus qualified 
Allied Health Professionals) share 
0.597 0.037 0.476 0.741 
Health Care Assistants share 0.246 0.046 0.121 0.393 
Hospital Expenditure Variables     
Share of expenditure on agency 
staff as a proportion of total 
expenditure (“Agency”) 
0.034 0.028 0.001 0.163 
Retained Surplus (£1000);745 obs -206.1 1313.4 -11487 8505 
Wages     
Ln(Area outside wage) 9.60 0.140 9.27 9.99 
Ln(nurse inside wage) 9.99 0.152 9.52 10.50 
Ln(area inside wage) 10.09 0.110 9.53 10.45 
Other variables     
Directly Standardized Mortality 
rate in local area (per 100,000) 
723.43 77.13 518.73 944.21 
Teaching trust 0.111 0.341 0 1 
Proportion of emergency 
admissions (to total admissions) 
0.411 0.082 0.224 0.808 
Proportion of transfer admissions 
(to total admissions) 
0.160 0.066 0 0.448 
Proportion of AMI admissions 
with complications (HRG E11) 
0.162 0.075 0 0.667 
HRG case mix index; 892 obs 93.98 9.08 75.49 175.89 
MRSA rate; 216 obs 0.169 0.088 0.02 0.55 
 
Notes: Acute hospitals in 211 English NHS (regression sample used in Tables 2-4).  Unless otherwise 
noted, data are for 901 observations between 1996 and 2001. Other case mix variables are admissions 
within 5 year age-gender bands for emergency AMI (age 55+) and for total admissions. Staffing 
variables refer to whole time equivalent clinical staffing.
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Table 2: Hospital quality and the outside wage  
 
Dependent variable Ln(AMI Death Rate) Ln(AMI Death Rate) Ln(AMI Death Rate) 
Estimation technique OLS 3 year annual Long Differences GMM-SYS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ln (Area outside wage) 0.407** 
(0.176) 
0.766** 
(0.386) 
0.460*** 
(0.175) 
Physicians share -0.856** 
(0.414) 
-0.654 
(0.616) 
-2.629** 
(1.258) 
Qualified Nurses share -0.480 
(0.306) 
-0.288 
(0.467) 
-1.416 
(0.959) 
(omitted base is health care assistants) 
 
Hospital fixed effects  No No Yes 
Casemix controls (14) Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies (10) Yes No Yes 
SC(1) p-value   0.000 
SC(2) p-value   0.142 
Hansen-Sargan p-value   0.923 
No of Hospitals 210 133 210 
Observations 901 345 901 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Quality is measured by the within hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) for over 55 year olds admitted to the 
hospital. Casemix controls are the proportion of total emergency admissions for AMI made up by each 5-year age-gender band from age 55 upwards. All regressions control 
for area mortality rates, (lagged) employment and hospital type (i.e. whether the acute hospital was a specialist hospital, teaching hospital or “normal” hospital). Long-
differences are three- year annual average growth rates.  In the System-GMM estimates, one-step robust estimates are presented equations are levels of own values t-2 
through t-5; instruments in the levels equations are once lagged differences. SC(k) is Arellano-Bond (1991) test of serial correlation. Physician share, nurse share and total 
employment are treated as endogenous (the outside wage is lagged and treated as exogenous). We also use the lagged predicted inside wage as an instrument. In the GMM 
specification instruments in the differenced of order k of the first differenced residuals. Sargan-Hansen is a test of all the over-identifying restrictions. Time period is 1996-
2001. Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and autocorrelation.  
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Table 3: Productivity in hospitals and the outside wage  
 
Dependent variable Ln(Productivity) Ln(Productivity) Ln(Productivity) 
Estimation technique OLS 3 year annual Long Differences GMM-SYS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ln (Area outside wage) -0.658*** 
(0.198) 
0.252 
(0.279) 
-0.551*** 
(0.181) 
Physicians share 3.837*** 
(0.484) 
0.248 
(0.411) 
3.909*** 
(0.898) 
Nurses share 0.386 
(0.278) 
0.006 
(0.216) 
1.736*** 
(0.627) 
(omitted base is health care assistants) 
Hospital fixed effects  No No Yes 
Casemix controls (39) Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies (10) Yes No Yes 
SC(1) p-value   0.004 
SC(2) p-value   0.462 
Hansen-Sargan p-value   0.042 
No of Hospitals 210 133 210 
Observations 901 345 901 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Productivity measured as the number of Finished Consultant Episodes (FCEs) per whole-time 
equivalent (WTE) employee; casemix controls are proportion of admissions in five year age-gender cells and the proportions of admissions that are (a) elective, (b) 
emergency or (c) transfers. All regressions control for area mortality rates, (lagged) employment size and hospital type (i.e. whether the acute hospital was a specialist 
hospital, teaching hospital or “normal” acute hospital). Long-differences are three-year annual average growth rates.  In the System-GMM estimates, one-step robust 
estimates are presented. Physician share, nurse share and total employment are treated as endogenous (the outside wage is lagged and treated as exogenous). We also use the 
lagged predicted inside wage as an instrument. In the GMM specification instruments in the differenced equations are levels of own values t-2 through t-5; instruments in the 
levels equations are once lagged differences. SC(k) is Arellano-Bond (1991) test of serial correlation of order k of the first differenced residuals. Sargan-Hansen is a test of 
the over-identifying restrictions. Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and autocorrelation.  
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Table 4: Controlling for the inside wage 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Ln(AMI Death 
Rate) 
Ln(AMI Death 
Rate) 
Ln(AMI Death 
Rate) 
Ln(Productivity) Ln(Productivity) Ln(Productivity) 
Estimation 
technique 
OLS Long Differences GMM-SYS OLS Long Differences GMM-SYS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln (Area outside 
wage) 
0.406** 
(0.171) 
0.765** 
(0.384) 
0.431** 
(0.172) 
-0.659*** 
(0.195) 
0.244 
(0.282) 
-0.547*** 
(0.172) 
Average inside 
wage 
-0.286** 
(0.122) 
-0.126 
(0.161) 
-0.334** 
(0.168) 
0.071 
(0.150) 
0.097 
(0.128) 
0.241** 
(0.125) 
Physicians share -0.498 
(0.443) 
-0.544 
(0.641) 
-1.787 
(1.236) 
3.750** 
(0.533) 
0.201 
(0.394) 
4.130*** 
(0.930) 
Nurses share -0.313 
(0.299) 
-0.253 
(0.471) 
-0.910 
(0.822) 
0.347 
(0.270) 
0.004 
(0.212) 
1.680*** 
(0.607) 
SC(1) p-value   0.000   0.002 
SC(2) p-value   0.162   0.436 
Hansen- p-value   0.795   0.081 
Hospital fixed 
effects  
No No Yes No No Yes 
Casemix controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies 
(10) 
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Hospitals 211 211 211 211 211 211 
Obs 901 901 901 901 901 901 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Quality is measured by the within hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission for 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI) for over 55 year olds admitted with AMI to the hospital. Productivity measured as the number of Finished Consultant Episodes 
(FCEs) per whole-time equivalent (WTE) employee; casemix controls are the same as in Table 2 (for AMI regressions) and Table 3 (for productivity). All regressions 
control for area mortality rates, (lagged) employment size and hospital type (i.e. whether the acute hospital was a specialist hospital, teaching hospital or “normal” acute 
hospital). System-GMM estimates with one-step robust estimates are presented. Physician share, nurse share, employment size and lagged inside wage (except in 
columns (3) and (6) where we exclude this variable) are treated as endogenous. Outside wage is lagged and treated as exogenous. Instruments in the differenced 
equations are levels of own values t-2 through t-5; instruments in the levels equations are once lagged differences. We also use the lagged predicted inside wage as an 
instrument. SC(k) is Arellano-Bond (1991) test of serial correlation of order k of the first differenced residuals. Sargan-Hansen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions. Time period is 1996-2001.  
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Table 5: The role of agency staff in accounting for the impact of the labor market on hospital quality and productivity 
    
Dependent 
variable 
Ln(Agency) Ln(AMI) 
 
Ln(AMI) 
 
Ln(AMI) 
 
Ln 
(productivity) 
 
Ln 
(productivity) 
 
Ln 
(productivity) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln (Area  
outside wage) 
2.851** 
 (1.138) 
 0.314* 
(0.170) 
0.175 
(0.202) 
 -0.805*** 
(0.182) 
-0.729*** 
(0.194) 
Ln(Inside 
wage) 
0.077 
(1.045) 
 -0.494*** 
(0.153) 
-0.477*** 
(0.161) 
 0.219 
(0.134) 
0.296** 
(0.141) 
Ln(Agency)   0.057** 
(0.026) 
 0.046* 
(0.024) 
-0.106*** 
(0.027) 
 -0.057*** 
(0.018) 
SC(1) p-value 0.799 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.043 
SC(2) p-value 0.130 0.983 0.485 0.921 0.355 0.488 0.944 
Hospital fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies 
(6) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region 
dummies (10) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen p-value 0.377 0.178 0.651 0.314 0.379 0.351 0.471 
No. of hospitals 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Observations 523 520 520 520 520 520 520 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. “Agency” Expenditure is the share of total staff expenditure that is accounted for by expenditure 
on non-NHS nursing staff. Productivity measured as the number of Finished Consultant Episodes (FCEs) per whole-time equivalent (WTE) employee. Quality is 
measured by the within hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) for over 55 year olds admitted with AMI to the 
hospital. Physician share, nurse share, employment size, agency (except in columns (3) and (5) where agency is excluded) and inside wage (except in columns (2) and (5) 
where we exclude inside wages) are treated as endogenous. All columns are estimated by System GMM (instruments in the differenced equations are levels of own 
values t-2 through t-5; instruments in the levels equations are once lagged differences). Column (3) is an identical specification to column (3) of Table 4 and column (6) 
is an identical specification to column (6) of Table 5 except we estimate on the sub-sample where we observe agency staff expenditure. All standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedacity and autocorrelation; in the System-GMM estimates one step robust estimates are presented and all staff variables are treated as endogenous 
(outside wage is lagged and treated as exogenous). SC(k) is Arellano-Bond (1991) test of serial correlation of order k of the first differenced residuals. Sample size is 
larger in column (1) because we do not condition on lagged agency as we do in other columns. 
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Table 6: A Placebo experiment - productivity and outside wages in nursing homes for senior citizens 
 
Dependent variable Ln(revenues/hour) Ln(revenues/hour) Ln(revenues/hour) Ln(revenues/hour) Ln(output/hour) 
Estimation technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Ln (Area outside 
wage) 
-0.005 
(0.191) 
0.098 
(0.171) 
-0.039 
(0.152) 
0.119 
(0.589) 
-0.060 
(0.203) 
Ln(Inside wage) 0.169*** 
(0.051) 
0.182*** 
(0.031) 
0.170*** 
(0.045) 
0.165*** 
(0.059) 
0.052* 
(0.029) 
Ln (average hours)  -0.460*** 
(0.057) 
   
      
Nursing Home fixed 
effects? 
No No No Yes No 
Year dummies (2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Number of Nursing 
Homes 
649 649 513 443 649 
Observations 1,054 1,054 513 886 1,054 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Productivity measured in columns (1) through (4) by revenues divided by hours. Revenues measured 
by the number of occupied beds multiplied by average price per bed. Output is simply the number of occupied beds. Hours are total hours worked. All regressions control for 
proportion of qualified nurses, proportion of female, average age of worker, a quintic in size of the nursing home (measured by employees), the proportion of residents who 
are paid for by the government, regional dummies and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by nursing home. Data is from UK nursing homes in 1998 and 1999 (see 
Machin and Wilson, 2004), except for column (3) which is on 1998 only. 
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 Table 7: Robustness tests - coefficient (standard error) on outside wage 
 
 Dependent variable Ln(AMI) Ln(Productivity) Observations 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
1 Baseline 0.460** 
(0.175) 
-0.547*** 
(0.172) 
901 
2 Additional casemix controls 0.427*** 
(0.170) 
-0.556*** 
(0.153) 
900 (for AMI) 
892 (for productivity) 
3 Include hospital financial surplus  0.399** 
(0.182) 
-0.516*** 
(0.184) 
745 
4 Include lagged dependent variable: long-run 
[p-value] 
0.508*** 
[0.008] 
-0.572*** 
[0.020] 
901 
5 Drop Inner and Outer London 0.304** 
(0.156) 
-0.383** 
(0.173) 
776 
6 Drop big jumps in outside wage 0.530** 
(0.197) 
-0.622*** 
(0.167) 
885 
7 Balanced Panel 0.600*** 
(0.207) 
-0.612*** 
(0.163) 
582 
8 Regional outside wage 0.609 
(1.022) 
-0.445 
(0.587) 
901 
9 Regional outside wage (drop regional 
dummies) 
0.520*** 
(0.172) 
-0.493** 
(0.169) 
901 
10 Include alternative total hospital employment 
measure 
0.404** 
(0.160) 
-0.540** 
(0.170) 
901 
11 Include higher order and cross product terms 
in skill shares 
0.541*** 
(0.200) 
-0.637*** 
(0.181) 
901 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each cell reports the coefficient and robust standard error from a separate system GMM 
regression. Productivity measured as the number of Finished Consultant Episodes (FCEs) per whole-time equivalent (WTE) employee; Quality is measured by the within 
hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) for over 55 year olds admitted with AMI to the hospital. All regressions 
have the same System GMM estimation and specifications as follows: column (1) equivalent to Table 2 column (3); column (2) is equivalent to column (3) of Table 3. 
Outside wage is (lagged) area wage unless elsewhere specified. See text for exact experiments. 
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Figure 1: Hypothetical impact of regulated wage on the labor market 
 
 
 
Notes:  The theoretical impact of a nationally regulated wage on NHS labor supply in two areas with 
different outside labor markets. South (e.g. London area) has a stronger outside labor market with 
higher alternative wages than North, so the supply curve lies to the left. A single nationally fixed wage 
(so long as it is below the competitive level) will result in a lower number of employees in the South 
than in the North. 
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Figure 2: The role of private sector temporary agency nurses  
 
 
 
 
Notes: This describes the possible reaction of hospitals to a mandated wage when there is also the 
possibility of hiring temporary agency staff whose wages are not restricted by the regulation mandated 
to permanent staff. In the face of a regulated wage and a competitive market for agency nurses, the 
agency wage will rise and employment will from NPERMANENT  to  NTOTAL 
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Figure 3: The distribution of death rates from AMI across hospitals, 1995-2002 
 
 
Notes: Data for full panel of acute hospital trusts. The top line shows the evolution of AMI death rates 
at the 10th percentile (highest death rates) and the bottom line the evolution of death rates at the 90th 
percentile (lowest death rates).  
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Figure 4: The distribution of productivity (Finished Consultant Episodes per 
clinical staff member) across hospitals, 1995-2002 
 
 
Notes: Data for the full sample of acute hospital trusts. The top line shows the evolution of 
ln(productivity) at the 90th percentile (highest productivity) and the bottom line the evolution of 
ln(productivity) at the 10th percentile (lowest productivity).  
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Figure 5: Distribution of outside wages, intensity of use of agency nurses and 
AMI death rates in England  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are 1996-2001 averages. Outside pay is the average ln wages of all female non-manual 
workers (from New Earnings Survey).  Intensity of use of agency nurses is the proportion of employees 
who are agency staff. AMI rates are within hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission for 
acute myocardial infarction for over 55 year olds admitted with AMI to the hospital. 
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Figure 6: Nurse vacancy rates and outside wages 
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Notes: Each observation is one of the ten regions in England (the average region has 4.9m people and 
we have a 1% example of workers from the New Earnings Survey).   Outside pay is the average ln 
wages of all female non-manual workers (from New Earnings survey).  Vacancy rates are the 
proportion of nurse posts that have been vacant for three months or more (Office of Manpower 
Economics, 2003). 1996-2001 averages. The straight line is the prediction from a linear regression. 
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Figure 7: Intensity of use of agency nurses and outside wages 
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Notes: Each observation is one of the ten regions in England. Outside pay is the average ln wage of all 
female non-manual workers.  Intensity of use of agency nurses is the proportion of employees who are 
agency staff. 1996-2001 averages. The straight line is the prediction from a linear regression. 
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Figure 8: AMI death rates and outside wages 
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Notes: Each observation is one of the ten regions in England. Outside pay is the average ln wage of all 
female non-manual workers.  AMI rates are within hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency 
admission for acute myocardial infarction for over 55 year olds admitted with AMI to the hospital. 
1996-2001 averages. The curved line is the predictions from a regression of AMI death rates on the 
level and square of the ln(outside wage). 
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Figure 9: Changes in AMI death rates and changes in outside wages 
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Notes: Each observation is one of the ten regions in England. Outside pay is the average ln wage of all 
female non-manual workers.  AMI rates are within hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency 
admission for acute myocardial infarction for over 55 year olds admitted with AMI to the hospital. The 
variables are the growth rates between 1996 and 2001. The straight line is the prediction from a linear 
regression. 
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Appendix A: Brief review of literature on the impact of skills in hospital production and the 
responsiveness of medical labor supply to wages 
 
A1. The impact of medical staff on hospital output 
 
There is a growing literature on the importance of nurses in hospital production, although less focus on 
the impact of physicians. Jensen and Morrissey (1986) is one of the few papers that focus directly on 
the impact of physicians on hospital productivity. They find that increases in physicians increased 
hospital output, but by less than increases in nurses (although by more than medical residents).  This is 
surprising as physicians have longer in training and therefore are likely to have higher human capital. 
However, since the period covered by the data in this study, the amount of training received by nurses 
has risen and there has been considerable technological change in hospital production.  
 
Most of the literature on the impact of nurses on patient outcomes is from the US (see Curtin, 2003, for 
a recent review). Cross sectional studies dominate the literature and tend to find a significant effect of 
nurse labor on outcomes. Aiken et al. (2002) using a large cross section of acute care Pennsylvanian 
hospitals, examine the relationship between two measures of patient care (deaths within 30 days of 
admission and ‘failure to rescue’) and nurse staffing ratios (the average number of patients in a nurse’s 
workload). They find an effect of nurse staffing on both outcomes: the odds of patient mortality 
increased by 7% for every additional patient in the average nurse’s workload in the hospital.  Aiken et 
al. (2003) finds a positive relationship between education level and patient mortality Needleman et al. 
(2002) study over 5 million patient discharges from 799 hospitals in 11 states and use several measures 
of patient outcomes and hours of nursing care per day (adjusted for the severity of the casemix). They 
found a strong and consistent relationship between hours of nurse staffing and five outcomes for 
medical patients. These – and most - studies on the impact of nurses on quality of care use cross 
sectional data, so are unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity between hospitals. It is not clear a 
priori how this may bias the results: hospitals with high levels of staffing may be better hospitals, so 
generating an upward bias. Alternatively, they may attract sicker patients, so generating a downward 
bias. Bartel et al (2007) do use panel data and examine the relationship between job specific capital of 
nursing staff and patient outcomes, arguing that job specific capital is likely to impact upon the quality 
of the care provided in hospital settings.  Their analysis focuses on registered nurses (RNs) in intensive 
care units in 70 Veteran Association hospitals between 2003 and 2006.  They examine two measures of 
patient outcomes and define three measures of job specific capital. They find one of these - tenure of 
the RN in the hospital – is correlated with one measure of patient outcomes (infection rates) allowing 
for unobserved features of the Intensive Care Unit. However, they are unable to control for experience 
as well as tenure; thus tenure may be a marker for general nurse experience rather than unit specific 
capital. Mark et al (2004) also uses panel data and finds little evidence of a causal relationship between 
nurse staffing and hospital mortality.  
 
A2. Is the labor supply of nurses responsive to labor market conditions?  
 
Antonazzo et al (2003) review empirical evidence of nursing labor supply.  The estimates (mainly from 
North American studies) display a large degree of variation. Most of the studies are of hours, rather 
than participation per se.  Most studies point to a shortage of nurses; a recent summary of trends in the 
US market is provided by Buerhaus et al (2004). In the UK, the hours margin is relatively inflexible as 
there is little choice in the number of hours worked per week in the NHS. Skatun et al (2005) and 
Frijters et al (2003) both use longitudinal data from the Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS). Frijters 
et al (2003) look at quitting decision and conclude that wages have a small effect relative to non-wage 
factors. Skatun et al (2005) look at labor market participation (but not at occupational choice between 
nursing and other in work options). Both these papers find that the wage elasticity of participation is 
below unity; the estimates in Frijters et al are less than under 0.1.  
 
On the other hand, Gosling and Van Reenen (2005) use the structure of pay determination for public 
sector nurses to identify the impact of wages on participation in nursing.  This approach deals with the 
endogeneity of wages by using regulatory decisions as an instrumental variable for the observed wage 
in a (selection adjusted) participation equation. They also allow for the participation choice to include 
working in another profession, rather than simply to be not-working.  They find estimates of the 
elasticity of wage on employment elasticities are biased downwards in OLS and reasonably large in 
their IV results, typically around unity.  And research in another setting in which wages for nurses are 
  60
set centrally – Norway – which uses panel data also finds nurses’ labor supply responds to wages (and 
other factors): see Askildsen et al (2002) and Holmas (2002).  
 
Finally, Elliot et al (2007) uses a sample of English hospitals for the years 1999-2002 and examines the 
association between the average (over the four years) wage gap between nurses pay and that of 
comparable women at regional level and the nursing vacancy rate at hospital level. They find that 
higher levels of the wage gap are positively associated with higher vacancy rates. They do not exploit 
the panel nature of their data, so do not to control for heterogeneity across hospitals.  
 
Appendix B: Data Description 
 
Data sources for all variables are contained in Table A1.  
 
B1. Sample of hospitals 
We use data from financial year 1995/6 onwards referring to “1995”, etc. as indicating the 1995/6 
financial year. Trust data pre-1995/6 is only for those hospitals that had been given freestanding 
financial status within the NHS prior to that date.  By 1995/6 almost all hospitals had freestanding 
status; before that date the finances (and so expenditure data) for some were still recorded at District 
Health Authority level. AMI episodes (from HES) were subject to recoding (a change in ICD codes) in 
1994/5. We use only acute trusts for the analysis as there are very few non-acute trusts with over 150 
AMI admissions in a year. The results are robust to inclusion of these non-acute trusts. Consequently 
we do not have specialist or mental health trusts in the data. We include dummy variables in all the 
regressions to control for teaching hospitals.  
 
Use of AMI death rates as a measure of low hospital quality 
We use the “30-day” death rate for acute myocardial infarction (AMI). This measures in-hospital 
deaths within 30 days of emergency admission with a myocardial infarction for patients aged 55 and 
over.  There are several issues in using this measure. The first is the variability in rates: death rates may 
be quite variable over time hospital-by-hospital, reflecting, in part, small denominators (hospitals may 
treat relatively few patients in any one year).    This noise in the measures of death rates can lead to 
misclassification of the quality of hospitals (McClellan and Staiger, 1999).  Propper et al (2007) 
conclude that raw UK hospital level rates exhibit considerably less variability than the raw US data, but 
not than the US rates which have been ‘filtered’ to reduce noise.  To reduce misclassification based on 
small sample sizes, we omit all hospitals with less than 150 emergency AMI admissions in any one 
year   
 
The second issue is that we use the thirty-day rate itself. The seven day rate was not available until 
1999, but it is highly correlated with the thirty-day rate and results using this as the dependent variable 
show similar patterns. We were also concerned that some patients may die after thirty days and we are 
missing these deaths. Examination of the distribution of AMI deaths in hospitals from other sources, 
however, shows that about half of deaths from AMI occur within the first day of admission (see Table 
A2 below). 98% of the deaths occur within the first thirty days. Consequently the thirty-day window is 
more than adequate. 
 
The third issue arises because our measure is the death rates within a hospital. Deaths occurring after 
transfer to another provider are credited to the provider where the patient was first admitted, whilst 
deaths following discharge are omitted. This may bias the results if hospitals have a motive to 
discharge early. Such incentives would have been small as these death rates were not published until 
1999 and hospitals not ranked by the Department of Health in terms of outcomes until 2001, when they 
were ranked on a composite bundle of over twenty indicators. Finally, in richer areas hospitals it may 
be possible that there are earlier discharges because patients have more care available. This would bias 
our results against finding an effect of the outside wage on AMI in hospital deaths.  
 
We lose 1995 because of the need to use lagged values in some regressions. Starting with 1,000 acute 
hospital-year observations after cleaning, we lose 83 observations because of the condition to have 150 
AMI admissions. We lose 10 observations because of the need for continuous series.  
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B2. Wages 
(a) Inside Wage 
Out main measure of the inside wage is the average hourly clinical wage. This is constructed by 
dividing the clinical wage bill by whole time equivalent hours. We also considered the wages of 
individual groups of workers separately, but found these variables insignificant once we controlled for 
overall clinical wage.  
 
(b) Regulation 
To get an idea of the regulated pay structure consider nurse pay scales at 1st April 1999. Clinical grades 
range from A to I and correspond to spinal points 3 to 37 (see Table A3).  For example, Clinical Grade 
G, a “district nurse” corresponds to a grade between spinal points 12 (£20,145 per annum) to spinal 
point 9 (£23,300 per annum). There are allowances (or “weightings”) for being in high cost areas. For 
Inner London this was £2,205 plus 5% of salary up to a maximum of £750, for Outer London this was 
1570 plus 5% of salary up to a maximum of £750 and for the “fringe” (various areas in the South East) 
this was £285 plus 2.5% of salary up to a maximum of £375. For a senior nurse on £23,300 a year 
working in the most expensive area of the UK, Inner London, and the extra regional allowance would 
be worth only 11% more salary (£2,205 + £750/ (£2,205+£750+£23,300)). Since this is capped, for a 
more senior nurse on a higher salary the proportional value is lower.  By contrast, in 1999 in the NES 
the annual non-manual wage in Inner London is about 65% higher than that of the North East, the 
lowest wage region. 
 
In calculating the instrumental variable for inside pay measure we take into account the NHS grade 
structure in a region in a year (using wage data from the NES). We then use the decisions of the NPRB 
over the changes in the wage structure taking into account all the London weightings, etc (which may 
differ by grade) to form the predicted wage in the next period (specific to each region).  
 
(c) Outside Wage 
We use several measures of outside wages. Our main measure is the average wages of non-manual 
female workers since the overwhelming bulk of nurses are women.  Our main measure is derived from 
the New Earnings Survey (NES) that is a one per cent sample of all employees in Great Britain 
covering about 300,000 individuals a year. The NES is mandatory administrative panel data provided 
by firms to the Department of Work and Pensions and contains information on earnings and hours. Our 
main measure is average annual earnings, but we also consider hourly wages. We use the area code in 
the NES to construct seventy-eight distinct county-based travel to work areas (or boroughs in London). 
Using the postcodes of the headquarters of county (and borough) councils, we matched each NHS 
hospital to all county (borough) councils that fell within a twenty-kilometer radius from the hospital. 
The local area wage is constructed as the average of the county wages of all the councils that fell into 
this radius. Where no councils fell within the twenty kilometer radius the wage applicable to the nearest 
council was used. 
 
As an alternative to the NES we also considered the Labor Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a self-
reported household survey containing about 320,000 individuals per year (with 80,000 observations on 
wages). From the LFS we can extract spatial wage differentials conditioning on more characteristics to 
build up the outside wage offered to a “typical” nurse. We experimented with such measures that 
successfully predict labor supply problems in the cross section (e.g. Elliot et al, 2007). The smaller 
sample size and sampling variation, however, means that such constructed variables are less useful in a 
panel data analysis. So for the most part, we rely on the larger sample sizes of the NES that has less 
measurement error as it is taken directly from employer records. We also experimented with using 
measures of unemployment rates and employment rates as alternative indicators of labor market 
“tightness”. We did not find that these added explanatory power over and above the information in the 
wage, which in principle should fully reflect labor market conditions. 
 
B3. Health Episode Statistics (HES) Data 
HES data are used for the AMI, productivity and case mix variables. HES are discharged based records 
of all inpatient activity delivered in NHS hospitals. The main unit of recording is the Finished 
Consultant Episode (a period of admitted patient care under a consultant or allied healthcare 
professional within an NHS trust). This is not always the same as a single stay (spell) in hospital, 
because a patient may be transferred from one consultant to another during their stay. In these cases, 
there will be two or more episode records for the spell of treatment.  Diagnoses are currently coded 
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according to the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision (ICD-10) and surgical 
procedures (operations) according to the Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys: Classification of 
Surgical Operations and Procedures, fourth Revision (OPCS-4.2).  HES records includes further codes 
– for example, age of the patient55.  
 
B4. Case-mix adjustment of FCEs 
For the robustness tests in Table 7 we calculated extra casemix controls. To estimate the casemix 
adjustment for a hospital, all inpatient spells are allocated to a Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) 
category. An HRG is a code for a group of clinically similar treatments and care that require similar 
levels of healthcare resources. They are similar to Diagnostic Related Groups or DRGs in the US. An 
example of an HRG is renal dialysis, separated into haemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis.  HRG codes 
are derived from ICD-10 and the OPCS 4.2 codes on HES records.  
 
For additional AMI casemix we constructed "AMI with complications" from the proportion of 
emergency patients 55 years or older admitted with HRG codes E11 (AMI with complications) and 
E12 (AMI without complications).  
 
For the productivity casemix we begin with a weight representing the expected cost (the reference cost) 
is attached to each HRG to derive the scalar case mix index for all spells treated over a year for each 
hospital. The national average case weight is set to equal 100: case mix indices above 100 represent 
hospitals that have treated a more complex than average mix of cases. The index used here based on 
reference costs from 1998/99 onwards (when reference costs were first available). Prior to that, the cost 
weights prior are based on expected costs. Because we are concerned about the precise consistency of 
this variable before and after 1998, we use it only as a robustness check rather than include it in our 
main specifications.  
 
B5. Nursing Homes Data 
The nursing (or “care”) homes data is discussed in the text and in more detail in Machin and Wilson 
(2004). Homes were surveyed in 1997 and 1998 (there is also data in 1992 and 1993, but this does not 
contain the information needed to construct revenue). We observe individual worker data so we can 
construct various measures of the internal wage structure of the firm. Information was also collected on 
average price (a quality measure), the proportion of residents who are government subsidised and 
various demographic characteristics of workers (their qualifications, age, gender, etc.). 
 
Total revenue and profits are not reported directly in the care homes data. We calculated them from the 
underlying home-specific components. Sales (S) is calculated as Occupancy Proportion* Number of 
Beds * Average Price (all reported in the survey). Average weekly hours are reported in the survey and 
our key measure is therefore revenues per hour. We also consider the physical measure of productivity 
as output per hour ((Occupancy Proportion* Number of Beds)/(hours*workers)). We matched in 
outside wages using zip codes using exactly the same data and methods as for hospitals. 
 
B6. UK Firm-level panel data 
All incorporated UK firms, both private and public, are obliged to lodge accounts at Companies’ 
House. Bureau Van Dijk (BVD), a private company, supplies this accounting data through its 
AMADEUS database. We appended the Amadeus DVDs from 1996 to 2006 to generate longitudinal 
data on living and dead firms from 1988 onwards. From this we selected all firms in two digit 
industries 53 through 60, 71 through 79 and 81. We ran regressions at the three digit industry level. We 
chose these because (a) they were service sectors so more comparable with the health sector and (b) 
they are mainly sectors where there are a relatively large proportion of women workers (like hospitals).  
 
We selected firms who were alive at some point between 1996 and 2001, who had non-missing 
information for at least one year on employment, wages, sales and capital. We also insisted in having at 
least 100 observations in each three digit industry. We matched in outside wages using zip codes using 
exactly the same data and methods as for hospitals. We are left with 63,052 firm-year observations in 
the overall dataset that we run regressions on. 
 
The full set of results from the industry-specific regressions is contained in Table A4.  
                                                 
55 http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=537 (accessed 4 
July 2006). 
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Appendix C. Calculation of estimates of costs of a life year saved 
 
Estimates of the cost per life year saved by increasing nurses’ wages (by increasing the inside wage) 
and increasing the shares of skilled labor are as follows.   
 
We use the GMM estimates of Table 2 (column 3) and Table 4 (column 3), mean AMI death rates 
(mean death rate = 21%, mean AMI admissions = 385) and staff numbers (total staff = 1700, mean 
nurses = 1006) from our data, and mean wages for 199956.  
 
The reduction in fatalities and the costs are: 
• A 10% increase in inside wages decreases death rate by 3.71%. New death rate = 20.23%. 
Decrease in deaths = (385*0.0077) = 3. Cost = (£1,006*10%*£15,000) = £1.5m.  
• A one-percentage point increase in the share of nurses reduces AMI death rate by 1.4%. Death 
rate fall = (21%*0.014) = 0.294%. Decrease in deaths = (385*0.00294) = 1. A one-percentage 
point increase in nurses (relative to unskilled) = 17. Cost = 17*£(15,000-£10,000) = £85,000.  
• A one-percentage point increase in share of physicians reduces AMI deaths rates by 2.6%. 
Decrease in deaths = 2. Cost = 17* £(50,000-10000) = £680,000.  
 
To derive an estimate of the cost per life year saved we translate one fatality reduction into life years 
gained. The modal admission in our data is a male aged 70-74.  Life expectancy in 2000 for this age-
gender group ages was 11.157, so each fatality reduction = 11 saved life years.  With this assumption 
the ball park cost of one patient year gained from:  
• increasing inside nurse wages =  £45,000  
• increasing physician share =  £31,000  
• increasing nurse share =  £8,000. 
 
These can be compared with US estimates of the cost per life year of technological innovation. Cutler 
and McClellan (2001) estimated the cost of a one year increase in life expectancy after a heart attack 
was around $10,000 between 1984 and 1998, which Heidenreich and McClellan (2001) attribute to the 
use of low cost treatments such as aspirin, beta-blockers, and thrombolytics.  Skinner et al (2006) 
derive a cost per life year saved of just under $300,000 for the period since 1996.  Note our back of the 
envelope estimates are a lower bound as they incorporate only the impact of preventing AMI fatalities 
and do not include any effect on productivity and the use of expensive agency staff. 
                                                 
56 Staff numbers from Table 1. Wages: £15,000 p.a. for a qualified nurse, £10,000 for a health assistant 
and £50,000 for a physician  
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Pressreleases/DH_4002451).  
57 Government Actuary calculations for England for 1999-2001  
http://www.gad.gov.uk/Life_Tables/docs/whltengm.xls 
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Table A1: Data sources 
 
 Source of Data Years  
AMI deaths and admissions 
rates 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) 1995-2002 
Finished Consultant Episodes 
(FCEs) 
HES 1995-2002 
AMI case mix HES; HRG codes E11 (AMI w/ 
complications) and E12 (AMI w/o 
complications)  
1996-2002 
FCE case mix HES; index based on HRGs and 
national reference costs 
1995-2001 
Whole time equivalents of  
clinical staff (Physicians, 
Qualified Nurses Unqualified 
Nurses; Qualified AHPs; 
Unqualified AHPs; Health 
Care Assistants) 
Department of Health Medical 
Workforce Census  
1995-2002 
Expenditure on agency nurses 
(and all other clinical staff 
groups) 
Trust financial returns (from Dept 
Health) 
1995-2002 
Nurse vacancy rates Office of Manpower Economics 1996-2001  
Local authority directly 
standardized all cause 
mortality rates and AMI rates 
Office of National Statistics 1995-2004 
Outside wage data (regional 
and area wages) 
New Earnings Survey 1995-2001 
MRSA rates Health Protection Agency 
Communicable Disease 
Surveillance Centre  
2001-2002 
Ambulance times Department of Health, Health Care 
Statistics  
1998-2002 
Trust retained surplus and 
deficits 
Trust financial returns TAC01 
(from Department of Health) 
 
1997-2002 
NPRB IV wage Gosling and Van Reenen (2005) 
predicted regional wage based on 
National Pay Review Body 
recommendation. 
1984-2001 
 
Notes: Both NES and NHS years are financial years commencing in April of each calendar year. ONS 
data are for calendar years.  
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Table A2: AMI admissions and in-hospital death rates in 1997/98, over 55s only 
 
 Primary diagnosis Primary or secondary diagnosis 
Time until death Frequency Percent of total Frequency Percent of total
0 days 3,220 26 3,647 25
1 day 2,780 22 3,213 22
2 days 1,424 11 1,683 11
3 to 5 days 2,111 17 2,511 17
6 to 10 days 1,456 12 1,811 12
11 to 20 days 914 7 1,197 8
21 to 30 days 251 2 336 2
More than 30 days 276 2 362 2
Total known 12,432 100 14,760 100
Unknown 1   1   
Total 12,433  14,761  
 
Source: Authors calculations from HES data. 
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Table A3: Example of nursing pay bands, 1st April 1999 
 
(a) Basic Pay Scales 
 
Clinical Grade Description, example Minimum £pa Spine points 
    
A Nursing Auxiliary £7,955(<18) 
£8,705 (18+) 
3 to 9 
B Nursing Auxiliary 
working without 
supervision 
£10,310 8 to 12 
C Enrolled nurse £11,735 12 to 17 
D Staff nurse without 
further qualifications 
£14,400 18 to 21 
E Staff nurse with 
qualifications 
£15,395 20 to 24 
F Ward sister £17,075 23 to 28 
G Ward sister with 
additional ward 
experience, district nurse, 
health visitor, community 
midwife 
£20,145 27 to 31 
H Senior nurse with 
responsibility for 
management of more than 
one ward 
£22,505 30 to 34 
I Senior nurse with 
management 
responsibility and 
teaching qualifications 
£24,920 33 to 37 
 
(b) Local Allowances 
 
Clinical Grade Inner London Outer London Fringe 
A and B £1850 + 5% of salary  up 
to a maximum of £750 
£1570 + 5% of salary 
up to a maximum of 
£750 
£285 + 2.5% 
of salary up to 
a maximum of 
£375 
C and above £2205 + 5% of salary up 
to a maximum of £750 
£1570 + 5% of salary 
up to a maximum of 
£750 
£285 + 2.5% 
of salary up to 
a maximum of 
£375 
 
 
Source: Income Data Services (2000) Pay in the Public Services: Review of 1999, prospects for 2000. 
One UK £ is approximately two US$. 
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Table A4: Productivity Regressions for service industries, 1996-2001, coefficient (standard error) on area outside wage 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(Sales per worker) 
Industry Name US SIC Code (1987) OLS 3 year annual Long 
Differences 
GMM-SYS Number of Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Department Stores 531 0.021 
(0.042) 
-0.038 
(0.623) 
-0.253 
(0.434) 
501 
Grocery Stores 541 -0.587 
(0.936) 
-0.004 
(1.730) 
0.375 
(1.307) 
219 
Meat and Fish  
Markets 
542 -1.022 
(1.032) 
-7.916*** 
(1.546) 
-0.379 
(1.148) 
71 
Confectionery Stores 544 2.257 
(3.832) 
5.975 
(5.717) 
-0.927 
(1.207) 
48 
Miscellaneous Food 
Stores 
549 -0.663 
(2.170) 
-1.356 
(4.595) 
-0.397 
(1.272) 
58 
Gasoline Service 
Stations 
554 1.458 
(2.118) 
3.472 
(1.991) 
1.052 
(1.806) 
179 
Motorcycle Dealers 557 -5.733** 
(2.574) 
1.639*** 
(0.415) 
-1.684* 
(1.017) 
32 
Family Clothing 
Stores 
565 0.458 
(0.442) 
-0.649 
(1.261) 
0.147 
(0.400) 
490 
Shoe Stores 566 -3.133*** 
(1.189) 
0.758 
(4.093) 
-1.801** 
(0.794) 
122 
Home furnishing 
Stores 
571 1.650*** 
(0.629) 
0.484 
(1.021) 
0.899 
(0.609) 
275 
Household Appliance 
Stores 
572 1.576* 
(0.811) 
0.050 
(1.578) 
1.681** 
(0.730) 
224 
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Eating and Drinking 
Places 
581 0.817** 
(0.377) 
0.368 
(0.742) 
0.152 
(0.351) 
1546 
Drug Stores and 
Proprietary Stores 
591 0.273 
(0.577) 
-1.725 
(1.870) 
0.044 
(0.609) 
223 
Liquor Stores 592 1.619 
(1.873) 
-0.964 
(2.297) 
0.433 
(1.321) 
71 
Used Merchandise 
Stores 
593 0.664 
(1.121) 
-2.359 
(9.258) 
0.502 
(1.163) 
146 
Jewelry Stores 594 -0.020 
(0.909) 
-1.437 
(1.987) 
0.396 
(0.955) 
155 
Catalog, Mail-Order 
Houses and direct 
selling outlets 
596 0.423 
(1.006) 
3.484 
(2.307) 
0.186 
(1.013) 
246 
Miscellaneous Retail 
Stores 
599 0.589 
(0.585) 
1.107 
(1.110) 
0.382 
(0.424) 
711 
Hotels and Motels 701 0.548** 
(0.268) 
1.393*** 
(0.437) 
0.184 
(0.225) 
1098 
Rooming and 
Boarding Houses 
702 -1.009 
(0.879) 
-5.308 
(4.305) 
-0.444 
(0.921) 
102 
Sporting, 
Recreational Camps 
703 1.373** 
(0.596) 
-0.276    
(0.670) 
0.642 
(0.501) 
88 
Laundry and Garment 
Services 
721 0.228 
(0.267) 
-0.543 
(0.542) 
0.057 
(0.222) 
3577 
Photographic Studios, 
Portrait 
722 -0.994 
(0.754) 
-2.153 
(2.436) 
-0.330 
(1.099) 
138 
Beauty Shops 723 -2.053** 
(0.826) 
3.315 
(10.585) 
-1.081 
(0.901) 
126 
Funeral Services and 
Crematories 
726 1.390* 
(0.779) 
0.555 
(2.225) 
1.520 
(0.883) 
166 
Miscellaneous 729 1.283 -3.885*** 0.493 46 
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Personal Services, (1.159) (1.013) (1.046) 
Advertising 731 -1.004* 
(0.526) 
0.283 
(0.944) 
-0.218 
(0.637) 
809 
Building Cleaning 734 0.522 
(0.495) 
1.797 
(1.231) 
0.815 
(0.371) 
215 
Industrial Rental 735 -0.370 
(0.483) 
0.558 
(0.960) 
-0.091 
(0.437) 
441 
Employment 
Agencies 
736 -0.005 
(0.561) 
0.289 
(1.032) 
-0.474 
(0.503) 
371 
Computer services 737 0.277 
(0.191) 
0.304 
(0.433) 
0.119 
(0.180) 
6151 
Misc. Business 
Services (security, 
news, photofinishing 
etc.) 
738 0.396* 
(0.220) 
-0.195 
(0.544) 
0.438** 
(0.199) 
7117 
Car Rental 751 0.827 
(1.217) 
1.156 
(1.262) 
0.892 
(1.190) 
180 
Auto repair shops 753 -0.161 
(0.618) 
0.954 
(0.796) 
0.056 
(0.493) 
492 
Non-auto repair shops 769 3.696 
(2.965) 
-5.646 
(6.739) 
-3.751 
(2.452) 
58 
Movie production 
services 
781 -1.824* 
(0.953) 
10.427 
(10.102) 
2.343** 
(0.994) 
139 
Movie distribution 
services 
782 -7.044 
(5.509) 
-26.706 
(16.205) 
-2.057 
(2.816) 
67 
Dance Studios 791 0.716 
(0.950) 
-4.476*** 
(1.520) 
0.434 
(0.685) 
709 
Theatrical Producers 
and Services (Except 
Movies)  
792 -0.168 
(1.149) 
5.480** 
(2.168) 
1.493 
(1.418) 
216 
  71
Professional Sports 
Clubs, racing and 
Promoters 
794 1.053** 
(0.419) 
0.363 
(0.537) 
0.817** 
(0.385) 
700 
Gyms and other 
sports recreation 
799 1.051 
(0.804) 
-0.562 
(0.891) 
0.495 
(0.652) 
528 
Legal Services 811 -0.095 
(1.101) 
2.314 
(3.856) 
0.676 
(0.924) 
100 
 
Notes: These specifications are analogous to those in Table 3. The coefficient (standard error) is that on the ln(outside wage) variable which is identical to that of Table 3 
(and elsewhere). We use company level panel data from UK part of AMADEUS data (all firms in UK economy with non-missing data on variables) between 1996 and 2001. 
We selected three digit industries in two digit codes from US SIC (1987) 53 through 60 and 71 through 81 (the main service industries in the private sector where women 
work). Only regressions with at least 100 observations were included (which is why some three-digit sectors where not used). Controls include ln(inside wage), 
ln(capital/labor ratio), ln(employees), 10 regional dummies and time dummies. Column (1) estimated by OLS. Long-differences are three- year annual average growth rates 
in column (2).   In the System-GMM estimates of column (3), one-step robust estimates are presented. Capital, employment and inside wages are treated as endogenous (the 
outside wage is lagged and treated as exogenous).  In the GMM specification instruments in the differenced equations are levels of own values t-2 through t-5; instruments in 
the levels equations are once lagged differences. Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and autocorrelation.  
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